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Prologue 
As sheep to a good shepherd, the Lord has given to man 
intellections of this present world. 
Evagrios of Pontus 
Texts on Discrimination, # 16 (EGP 1,48) 
Thoughts, like sheep, given the chance, are prone to wander aimlessly. 
Sheep follow one another, without any necessary sense of direction 
or purpose. They are often found gathered together in flocks, but 
each individual creature presents its own image of vulnerability and 
individuality. They get lost, and become sick or lame or hungry. But 
they can also be shepherded, thus gaining direction, and may be 
cared for, fed, and protected. A good shepherd will search out the 
lost, feed the hungry and care for the sick. 
Such an image, particularly for those familiar with rural life, 
offers. countless metaphorical and parabolic possibilities. Thus. 
most famously in the Christian tradition, Jesus is the good shepherd 
and we are the sheep of his pasture. ' Evagrios of Pontus (345/346- 
399), however, suggests that we are all shepherds and that God has 
given us thoughts - or here "intellections'' - as sheep to be cared 
for. 
It is a much neglected. and somewhat disconcerting, facet of 
the extended metaphor of sheep and shepherd, at least in relation 
to the New Testament of Christian scripture, that the sheep are. at 
the end of the day, there for the shepherd. or for the one whom the 
shepherd serves, and not primarily the other way around. In ancient 
times, as now, sheep were kept for their wool and lambs for meat. 
Then, although less commonly now, lambs were killed for sacrifice. 
Unless they are the victims of sickness. or of marauding wolves. 
sheep and lambs are eventually put to death. Perhaps this reality 
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betrays an intended irony when the Jesus of John's gospel expresses 
his willingness to lay down his life for his sheep? However, returning 
to the metaphor of thoughts as sheep that human beings shepherd in 
their minds, can we say that these sheep are there for the benefit of 
those who think them, or for those whom the thinker serves, rather 
than for their own sake? 
The answer to this question will depend upon theology and philo- 
sophy for it could well be argued, amongst other things, that the 
thoughts are simply there for no purpose or that they are there for 
the benefit of those who think them, or that they are ultimately there 
for the glory of God. Perhaps it is a little more helpful, however, 
to ask what the purpose might be of shepherding these thoughts? 
Surely most people shepherd their thoughts with a purpose in mind? 
That purpose might be to serve their own advantage, or to serve 
the benefit of others, or to serve God, or perhaps it might be for 
some other purpose. However, the fact is that we do shepherd our 
thoughts and that we perceive ourselves as doing so for a reason. No 
matter how much they wander randomly, become sick, follow the 
wrong leader, or otherwise misbehave, it is a feature of the inner life 
of human beings that we do keep trying to shepherd our thoughts 
in particular ways with particular purposes in mind. The writing 
and the reading of this text are but one example of this amongst 
an infinite number of possible examples that could be taken from 
the thoughts that humans have, whether communicated in speech 
or writing or remaining secret within our own minds and souls. 
Furthermore, the shepherding of thoughts is something which 
we perceive as uniquely and characteristically human and as deeply 
intimate. To talk about the ways in which we shepherd thoughts 
within our own inner space is to talk about something which gets to 
the heart of what it means to be human and also - at the individual 
level - to the heart of what it means to be "me'". Thoughts are 
very personal and yet, because they wander like sheep, going to 
places to which we perhaps wish they hadn't gone, we may be 
ashamed of them and not want other people to know about them. 
Undoubtedly most of us, most of the time, only share with others 
those thoughts that we feel pleased with, or at least which are not 
embarrassing. We talk about the ones that are shepherded in ways 
that we think others will approve of, but not about the ones that get 
lost, or the ones that we took to prohibited places. Our conversation 
about the shepherding of our thoughts, if not the actual business of 
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shepherding, is strongly determined by a sense of what is socially 
acceptable. 
In a post-Freudian world, we are aware that much of what we 
"think" is unconscious and that the unconscious world - of which we 
are generally not explicitly aware, but about which we are generally 
uneasy - has characteristic ways of making itself felt: in dreams, in 
slips of the tongue, in humour and so on. Indeed, so familiar are we 
now with this concept that we feel less ashamed than we used to of 
confessing thoughts that Freud has led us to believe we need not 
be ashamed about. Or, at least, we are less ashamed of some such 
thoughts some of the time, for we now seem to spend much more 
time in western society talking about sex, but much less time talking 
about death, for example. 
Applying this Freudian knowledge to our metaphor of thoughts 
as sheep and ourselves as shepherds, we might say that we don't 
always know where our sheep have gone, but we are often vaguely 
aware that there are some missing. Or else we might be more ready 
to admit pasturing sheep in some places than in others. But, still, the 
process of tending this flock is very important to us and we spend 
much - if not all - of our waking life giving it our attention. 
Where, then, does this extended metaphor take us? 
It is used here primarily for two reasons. Firstly, it facilitates an 
introduction to talking about why our inner world is important to us 
as human beings and yet why we also often do not speak about it. 
Secondly, however, the quotation with which it began is taken from 
one of the earlier contributions to a collection of texts known as 
the Philokalia - an anthology of spiritual writings from the Eastern 
Christian tradition, spanning the fourth to the fifteenth centuries C. E. 
Philokalia means literally 'love of the beautifulbut is usually 
understood in Greek as referring to an anthology of works. ' Today, 
reference to the Philokalia is usually taken, unless specified oth- 
erwise, to denote a particular anthology assembled by two Greek 
monks in the eighteenth century, which was first published in Venice 
in 1782. The compilers. N ikodimos of Mount Athos (1749-1809) 
and Makarios of Corinth (1731-1805) apparently chose their texts 
with a view to making more widely available that which would be 
helpful in the spiritual life, drawn from the hesychastic tradition. 
This tradition, broadly understood, seeks to find an inner stillness 
of the soul - away from the distractions of thoughts and desires 
- within which contemplation of God might be undertaken and, 
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eventually. union with God found. In other words, it is a tradition 
of Christian prayer which emphasises attention to the inner life, 
the life of thoughts, with a view to the purpose of contemplating 
God himself. To quote from another contributor to the Philokalia, 
Maximos the Confessor, and following the same metaphor used by 
Evagrios. within this tradition: 'sheep represent thoughts pastured 
by the intellect on the mountains of contemplation'. ' 
The intention here, then, is to explore the ways in which this 
collection of texts might help with the process of shepherding 
thoughts or. to be less allegorical, the ways in which the tradition 
expressed within this collection of texts might assist in developing a 
Christian understanding of the inner life of thoughts and of nurturing 
mental well-being. Necessarily, this exploration does not confine 
itself to the inner life - the Philokalia talks of virtue in Christian 
living and not only of thoughts and desires. However, it does 
emphasise the life of prayer as the only basis on which Christians 
can properly understand the inner life or conceive of mental well- 
being. It thus assumes from the outset that the central. primary 
and underlying purpose for which Christians will properly and 
beneficially shepherd their thoughts is that of loving. serving and 
worshipping God. It also assumes that the shepherding of thoughts 
for other purposes - such as human happiness as an end in itself - 
will always be more or less unsatisfactory. However, whilst these 
are fairly major assumptions. which atheist shepherds of thoughts 
such as Freud would undoubtedly disagree with. it is not intended 
that they should hide this exploration away from a critical encounter 
with other shepherds and other traditions. On the contrary, such 
encounters are exactly what is intended here. 
These assumptions do recognise, however, that complete objec- 
tivity is not attainable, either in the inner life or in academic discourse. 
An observer must occupy a particular position in order to observe 
and an awareness of the subjectivity of the space which one occupies 
is, it is contended here, not a weakness but rather a strength. There 
may, then, be other reasons for my use of the metaphor of sheep and 
shepherd as an introduction to this work. In fact, perhaps there is a 
necessity - rather than merely the possibility - of other reasons for 
my beginning in this way. If I approach this work from an academic 
perspective. I must also necessarily approach it as an exploration of 
my own inner world from within the Christian tradition to which I 
belong. This will surely reveal that there must he other reasons for 
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my choice of this particular metaphor - reasons which are either 
concerned with my own conscious sense of vocation to be a shepherd 
of thoughts. or else perhaps my own unconscious thoughts around 
this theme (the "sheep" that I am only vaguely aware have "gone 
missing" from the fold of my consciousness). Perhaps - as I hope - 
these reasons concern my sense of purpose in combining a vocation 
to the priesthood with a training in clinical psychiatry and academic 
study. all of which seem to me to have this theme in common. Or 
perhaps - although I consciously deny it - they concern an attempt 
to find connections where there are none, to cover up the aimlessness 
of the mental wandering of my own thoughts like lost sheep. The 
point is not so much that either of these reasons is necessarily correct 
as that there are various possible reasons which are more concerned 
with the subjectivity of my vocation to write than the actual purpose 
of writing this particular text for others to read. 
This subjectivity of writing is not eliminable from this text, 
but neither is it entirely unhelpful. Because of it. I approach the 
Philokalia with a view to being challenged by its discourse as to 
the ways in which my own thoughts may better be shepherded. If I 
do not allow the texts of the Philokalia to challenge me in this and 
other ways, as I also myself challenge them with a spirit of critical 
academic enquiry, the encounter is false. Indeed, to talk about a 
subject such as this and to remain entirely unaffected, or to avoid 
altogether any examination of its impact upon the understanding 
of one's own thoughts, would seem rather dishonest. This is, after 
all, itself primarily an attempt to shepherd thoughts for a particular 
purpose - that of understanding better how the inner life may be 
understood and developed. Although the circularity of this process 
might seem to some to be undermining of objectivity, it is the reality 
of the process in which the compilers and authors of the Philokalia 
themselves engaged and in which they invite us to join them. Whilst 
I will not be uncritical of these fellow authors. I trust that I will show 
enough respect to take seriously what they have said to me. 
I have wondered (my thoughts wandering like lost sheep 
perhaps? ) what other metaphors might have been used to introduce 
this subject. As much of the writing was undertaken on Holy 
Island, in Northumberland. I looked across the beach and saw rocks 
scattered across the sea shore like sheep scattered across a pasture. 
I considered my own walks across these beaches and the way in 
which one's attention is divided between an intended destination 
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across the beach and the immediate task of finding a firm footing 
for one's next step. It is easy to go astray from the former goal 
because of the necessity of the latter task. Rocks on the beach, like 
thoughts in the mind, are necessary as a basis for moving forward, 
but can easily also lead away from the place to which one intended 
to travel. But the need to find a firm footing does not invalidate 
the destination or refute the evidence of the eyes. It speaks only to 
human limitation. 
Do such images assist in the examination of a subject which, 
since Freud, has become the subject of a vast and diverse technical 
literature? The possible answers to that question will be left for later 
consideration, but an unprejudiced examination of a pre-Freudian 
and pre-modern literature and the wisdom that it contains cannot 
avoid examining the possibility that they do assist in reaching a 
final destination; whereas, perhaps, the more technical tools of our 
contemporary academic discourse may confine themselves more to 
finding the next rock on which to stand. 
The writers of the Philokalia sought a final destination by means 
of taking individual steps with care. To the best of my ability I have 
sought to follow that example in my writing on this subject. This 
book may therefore be considered as comprising six steps towards 
the goal of understanding what the Philokalia has to tell us about 
mental well-being and the shepherding of thoughts. These steps 
are: 
In Chapter One I give consideration to influences that 
have helped to shape the writing of the Philokalia, its 
compilation, its teachings on the inner life of thoughts, and 
the foundations upon which it has been built. I do not feel 
that the teaching of the Philokalia on the inner life can be 
properly appreciated without this contextual information. 
2. In Chapter Two, I focus on the teaching of the Philokalia 
on thoughts of a particularly troublesome kind, which the 
Philokalia refers to as "passions". I have started here partly 
because this is such a central theme of the Philokalia, but 
also because it is where human beings start in trying to 
order their thoughts. It is a study in the unruliness of human 
thoughts, their tendency to go astray, and the nature of the 
challenge that they present to those who wish to shepherd 
them. 
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3. In Chapter Three, my controlling metaphor turns from 
rural life to the world of medicine, and I consider the 
remedies for the passions that the Philokalia prescribes. 
4. Chapter Four might be considered a glance towards my 
final destination, rather than a step forward. However, if 
it is a step forward, it is the step of understanding how the 
Philokalia conceives mental well-being. In the medical 
terms of the previous chapter, it is concerned with better 
understanding health in order to be better equipped to treat 
the disease of the passions. 
5. Chapter Five steps aside from the Philokalia in order to give 
consideration to the contemporary world of psychotherapy. 
What is psychotherapy, how does it conceive mental well- 
being, and what does it aim to achieve? The possibility of 
understanding the as providing a kind of psychotherapy is 
then considered. This raises questions about the nature of 
the soul, or self, and human concerns with inwardness and 
reflexivity. 
6. Chapter Six attempts to explore the relationship between 
thoughts and prayer. When the Philokalia is consulted 
as a source of reference on thoughts, or the inner life, it 
always turns the focus onto prayer. When it is consulted 
as a source of guidance on prayer, it turns the reader's 
attention towards a careful examination of their thoughts. 
This relationship therefore seems to be central to the 
Philokalia. It is studied here with reference to the preceding 
discussion on psychotherapy, and also by way of a brief 
exploratory engagement with some other western strands 
of thought, on philosophy (Paul Ricoeur on hermeneutics) 
and spirituality (Denys Turner and The Darkness of God). 
In the Epilogue, reflecting briefly on the steps that have been taken, 
we shall return to the theme of shepherding thoughts and ponder 
where our journey has taken us. 
I will close this introduction with one final quotation from the 
Philokalia on the theme of sheep and shepherds, this time from Ilias 
the Presbyter: 
Where fear does not lead the way, thoughts will be in 
a state of confusion, like sheep that have no shepherd. 
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Where fear leads the way or goes with them, they will 
be under control and in good order within the fold. Fear 
is the son of faith and the shepherd of the command- 
ments. He who is without faith will not be found worthy 
to be a sheep of the Lord's pasture. ' 
Here, then, is the question to be addressed. How does the Philokalia 
teach us that we can control and order thoughts that are confused, 
difficult to control and in disorder? 
1 
Influences and Foundations 
Explorations of the inner world of human beings might reasonably 
be expected to be dependent upon the outer world in which they 
live: its culture, its history, traditions, assumptions, language 
and beliefs. Such things influence the way in which we perceive 
ourselves and thus, at least potentially, the way in which we think. 
If we are to understand properly what the authors and compilers 
of the Philokalia had to say about the inner life it would therefore 
seem to be important to consider the nature of their outer world, 
and especially its anthropological assumptions and beliefs. 
However, this immediately presents a problem, for the Philokalia 
is the work of about 40 authors, and two compilers, whose lives 
span well over a thousand years. Can anything be said about "their 
world" which might go beyond vague generalities or spurious 
over-generalisations? 
It might be tempting to emphasise the importance of tradition 
to Byzantine civilisation and Orthodox Christianity as reason for 
expecting continuity of fundamental assumptions across even a 
thousand years and more of writing. However, it has famously been 
suggested that "to represent Byzantium as immutable over a period 
of eleven centuries is to fall into a trap set by Byzantium itself'. ' 
We must also remember that, during the period in question, some 
very significant events took place - not least the seven universally 
agreed ecumenical church councils and the great schism of 1054. 
The doctrinal, and especially the Christological, controversies that 
raged during this period variously affect different works within the 
Philokalia. For example, one work attributed to Neilos the Ascetic in 
the original Greek Philokalia is now known to have been by Evagrios 
of Pontus (345/346-399), but transmitted under the name of Neilos 
because of the tainting of reputation of Evagrios by his association 
ý 
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with Origenist heresy. Almost at the other end of the chronological 
span of the Philokalia. the writings of Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) 
show evidence of his concern to defend the hesychast tradition itself 
from its critics. Maximos the Confessor (580-662), the single biggest 
contributor of texts, was exiled and tortured for his defence of the 
doctrine of the divine and human wills in Christ, in keeping with the 
Council of Chalcedon. He was only vindicated at the 611 Ecumenical 
Council, almost 20 years after his death. The historical contexts and 
doctrinal preoccupations that emerge from place to place within the 
Philokalia are thus varied indeed, and in some places represent fierce 
controversies of their time. 
In an introduction to the English translation of the Philokalia, 
the translators and editors suggest that there is an inner unity to 
the Philokalia which is conferred more than anything by recurrent 
reference to invocation of the name of Jesus (or the Jesus Prayer as it 
is now known). They argue that this is one of the central forms of the 
art and science which constitute hesychasm" and that this is evident 
even in some of the earliest texts. ' It is again tempting to draw from 
this a reassurance as to common underlying assumptions within the 
Philokalia, but that would certainly be premature. The Jesus Prayer is 
but one theme amongst many to be found in these texts and it is hardly 
clear that it is a major theme in the earlier texts, even if it might be 
argued that evidence of it is to be found in them. It would seem in any 
case unlikely that a tradition of spirituality dating back to the fourth 
century would not have undergone at least some changes in emphasis 
and development of ideas - especially in view of the vicissitudes of 
its history. Thus, for example, the later texts would seem to show 
evidence of the influence of the Syrian spirituality introduced in the 
thirteenth/fourteenth century revival, an influence which exerts its 
own distinctive emphasis on these later texts. 
A glossary provided in the English translation to the Philokuliu 
also implies that there is a consistency of terminology throughout 
its span of writings. There is no doubt that this glossary provides 
helpful clarification for the reader who is new to the Philokalia and 
its world of thought, and that there is a terminology with which a 
reader gradually becomes familiar when reading and re-reading 
the Philokalia. However, greater familiarity begins to suggest that 
the appearance of consistency is almost as much confusing as 
it is helpful. Thus, for example, the glossary helpfully points out 
that even such a fundamental term as "passion" refers on the part 
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of some writers to something intrinsically evil, but on the part of 
others to something fundamentally good, something which may be 
redeemed.? Again, the helpful analysis of the process of temptation4 
refers to various sources, both from within the Philokalia itself and 
also John Climacus's Ladder of Divine Ascent, but careful study of 
these sources shows a heterogeneity of understandings, albeit with 
some core terms (such as "provocation"' or "assent") which are used 
more or less consistently. 
It is not, however, necessary to be completely nihilistic as to 
the possibility of grasping something of an understanding of the 
common assumptions that have formed the understanding of life in 
the inner world that is such a central theme of the Philokalia. Firstly, 
there have been historical, philosophical and theological influences, 
which appear to have provided something of an enduring source 
of reference to its authors. Secondly, there is evidence of internal 
consistency in regard to certain significant fundamental assumptions 
and themes - of which the Jesus Prayer is but one. 
It would therefore appear helpful here to give some further con- 
sideration to the following: 
l. The compilation and history of the Philokalia as an 
anthology of texts 
2. The anthropology of the Philokalia 
3. The tradition of the Desert Fathers 
4. The work of Evagrios of Pontus 
5. The use of scripture by the authors of the Philokalia 
To some extent these might be considered as external influences that 
helped to shape the Philokalia, but to some extent (especially in the 
case of Evagrios) they are internal to its fabric. They are therefore 
considered together here, partly as formative external influences 
and partly as foundational stones upon which the Philokalia was 
erected. 
1. Compilation, Translation and 
Evolution of the Philokalia 
The hesychastic tradition, from within which the Philokalia emerged. 
has a long history. From as early as the fourth century C. E. the term 
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"hesychia" was used by Christian monastic writers to refer to a 
state of inner quietness to be achieved in prayer as preparation for 
communion with God. From the sixth to the eleventh centuries in the 
Byzantine world a "hesychast" was simply a monk or ascetic, and 
hesychasm referred simply to a broadly contemplative approach to 
prayer. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there was something 
of a spiritual revival, centred on Mount Athos, in which Gregory of 
Sinai (1258-1346) and Gregory Palamas took a leading role. This 
gave birth to a movement now known as the "Hesychast Tradition", 
which drew upon traditions of Christian spirituality both from Syria 
and the Egyptian desert fathers. 
The hesychastic tradition came under fierce attack in the fourteenth 
century, primarily because of an assertion that prayer of the heart can 
lead to a vision of Divine Light; a light which, it was asserted, can 
be seen even in this life, and by human eyes in a literal physical 
sense. This light, it was further asserted, is identical to that which 
surrounded Christ on Mount Tabor in his transfiguration. Gregory 
Palamas, a contributor to the Philokalia, was a leading - and 
eventually successful -defender of the tradition against these attacks. 
Hesychasm was formally adopted at the Councils of Constantinople 
(1341,1347 and 1351) and subsequently became an accepted part of 
Orthodox spiritual tradition. ' 
The compilation and dissemination of the Philokalia in the 
eighteenth century represented a significant component of a re- 
naissance of the hesychastic tradition. ' The Philokalia was compiled 
by Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and Makarios of Corinth, 
both of whom belonged to the spiritual renewal movement of the 
"'Kollyvades". This movement was traditional and conservative, 
critical of liberal teaching of the enlightenment, and enthusiastic for 
the spirituality and theology of the Fathers of the Eastern Church. 
However, Nikodimos at least was not so conservative as to prevent 
his drawing upon western sources in his own writings. 7 
Makarios was born in 1731 in Corinth and was named Michael 
at his baptism. He was educated in Corinth and eventually became a 
teacher there himself. In 1764 the Archbishop of Corinth died, and 
Michael was elected his successor. In 1765, in Constantinople, he 
was ordained Archbishop and renamed Makarios. As Archbishop 
he began a series of reforms, including prohibition of clergy from 
holding political office, and measures to ensure that the clergy 
were properly educated. The outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war 
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in 1768 forced Makarios to leave Corinth and although peace 
was restored in 1774 another Archbishop was appointed in his 
place and he never resumed his position there. In 1783 Makarios 
anonymously published Concerning Frequent Communion of the 
Divine Mysteries, in which he argued the case of the Kollyvades 
in favour of more frequent reception of communion than the two 
or three times each year that had become customary. The book 
was hastily condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarch but later (in 
1789) approved and recommended by a new Patriarch. The last 
years of his life, from 1790 to 1805, were spent almost entirely in a 
hermitage on Chios where, according to Cavarnos, he "[subjected] 
himself to severe ascetic struggle, practicing interior prayer, writing 
books, confessing and counselling people, instructing them in the 
true Faith, inciting them to virtue, and offering material help to 
those in need"'. 8 
Nikodimos was born in 1749 on Naxos, one of the Aegean 
islands. He was educated initially on Naxos, and from the age of 
15 years at Smyrna, where he learnt Latin, Italian and French. In 
1775 he went to Mount Athos and became a monk. It was in 1777 
that Makarios visited Athos and gave him the task of editing the 
Philokalia, and also two other works, ' although in fact the two men 
had first met some years earlier on the island of Hydra. Nikodimos 
went on to become a prolific author, editor and translator of other 
theological works. "' Nikodimos' last years were spent in writing, 
and it is as an author, translator and compiler that his life most stands 
out. However, there is also no reason to doubt the testimony that 
he practiced mental prayer assiduously throughout his 34 years on 
Mount Athos. " It would not seem unreasonable to speculate that 
his introduction to the Philokalia by Makarios in 1777 exerted a 
lifelong influence upon him. 
Clearly the selection of texts for inclusion in the Philokalia is a 
very significant matter, but we know surprisingly little about how the 
selection was made. Constantine Cavarnos first reports a traditional 
view that it was compiled by monks on Mount Athos in the fourteenth 
century, but then goes on to assert that Makarios himself was the 
real compiler. '' Certainly it is clear that Makarios was the more 
senior editor and that the initiative for the work came from him and 
not from Nikodimos. '3 We might speculate that the selection was 
not actually made by Nikodimos and Makarios, but rather already 
existed in some way as a collection of texts revered by tradition, 
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or else already assembled by earlier compilers. Alternatively, Ware 
has suggested, there may have been a policy of including rare or 
unpublished texts. " 
We do know that the texts were drawn from the libraries of 
Mount Athos. The introduction by Nikodimos refers to "manuscripts 
which had been lying inglorious and motheaten in holes and corners 
and darkness, cast aside and scattered here and there". " In this 
introduction. Nikodimos also describes the purpose of the Philokalia 
as being the provision of a "mystical school", of mental (or "inward") 
prayer' 6: 
Thisbook isatreasury of innerwakefulness, the safeguard 
of the mind, the mystical school of mental prayer.... an 
excellent compendium of practical spiritual science, the 
unerring guide of contemplation, the Paradise of the 
Fathers, the golden chain of the virtues.... the frequent 
converse with Jesus, the clarion for recalling Grace, and 
in a word, the vey instrument of theosis. "" 
The full title of the original Greek Philokalia is: 
The Philokalia of the Neptic Saints gathered from our 
holy Theophoric ["God-bearing"] Fathers, through 
which, by means of the philosophy of ascetic practice 
and contemplation, the intellect is purified, illumined, 
and made perfect. 's 
The English translators of the Philokalia, commenting on the title 
and subtitle, suggest that it is through "love of the beautiful" that 
the intellect is "purified, illumined and made perfect", and that it 
was this purpose of purification, illumination and perfection that 
governed the choice of texts. 19 The texts of the Philokalia are thus, 
they argue, "guides to the practice of the contemplative life". 20 
Kallistos Ware, 21 one of the English translators of the Philokalia, 
has suggested that reflection on its contents enables us to deduce 
something about its scope, its aim and the means that it recommends 
to those who wish to achieve its aim. The scope of the Philokalia 
he understands as being defined by its focus on the inner life, 
characterised especially by the concepts of nepsis (watchfulness) 
and hesychia (stillness). The aim of the Philokalia he identifies 
as deification. The means to this end he identifies as being a life 
of unceasing prayer from the depths of the heart, exclusive of all 
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images and thoughts, in which the name of Jesus is invoked, and in 
which particular physical techniques (see, for example, Chapter 3, 
p. 147) may or may not be employed. 
Ware further suggests that the spirituality that emerges from the 
Philokalia has four characteristics: 
I. A predominant influence of Evagrios and Maximos 
2. A basic antinomy between the knowabi l ity and unknow- 
ability, the immanence and transcendence, of God which 
might be regarded as "Palamite'', although preceding the 
time of Gregory Palamas 
3. An absence of western influence 
4. A relevance to all Christians 
Whilst questions remain about exactly what guided the inclusion 
and exclusion of particular texts, the overall thrust of the Philokalia 
would therefore seem fairly clear. This is an anthology of eastern 
Christian texts designed to assist in the inner life of prayer. 
All the texts included in the Philokalia by Nikodimos and 
Makarios were originally written in Greek, except for two by John 
Cassian, which were translated from Latin into Greek during the 
Byzantine period. We may count 62 texts included in the Philokalia 
(see Appendix 1). 222 
The authors were undoubtedly all men (although the actual 
authorship of some texts remains in dispute) and all belonged to the 
monastic tradition. Cassian is the only "'western " author included. 
The single biggest contributor was Maximos the Confessor, followed 
by Peter of Damaskos. About some of the authors we know much; 
about others, however, we know little or nothing with any certainty. 
We may calculate that there were approximately 40 or more authors 
in all (see Appendix 2). Attributions of authorship of some texts in 
the original Greek edition are now known to be incorrect. In several 
cases we know that contributions were made to particular texts by 
two or more authors. 
The Philokalia, as a compilation of the original Greek texts, 
prepared by Makarios and Nikodimos, with an overall introduction 
and with notes to introduce the texts associated with each author, 
was published in a single volume in Venice in 1782 at the expense of 
John Mavrogordatos, Prince of Moldo-Wallachia. 23 A second edition 
was produced in Athens in 1893, including some additional texts by 
R The Philokalia and the Inner Life 
Patriarch Kallistos. A third edition was produced in five volumes, 
also in Athens, in 1957-1963.24 
The first translation of the Philokalia, into Slavonic, was made by 
Paisius Velichkovsky (1722-1794). 25 and was published in Moscow 
in 1793 under the title Dobrotolubiye and under the sponsorship of 
Metropolitan Gabriel. -' Velichkovsky was a Ukrainian monk who 
lived on Mount Athos from 1746-1763. He was later abbot of large 
monasteries at Dragomirna (1763-1775) and Niamets (1779-1794) 
in Romania and was the initiator of a spiritual renaissance there 
within the hesychastic tradition. 
During his time on Mount Athos, Velichkovsky developed a 
concern to find, copy, collect and translate patristic texts. Initially 
this seems to have arisen out of an inability to find a suitable spiritual 
instructor (or starets). Starchestvo (or eldership) was a key element 
in the hesychastic tradition. -'' However, as Velichkovsky was unable 
to find someone suitable as his own starets, he seems to have turned 
to patristic writings as an alternative source of instruction. ' The 
concern for patristic texts that he acquired in this way early in life 
continued during his later life as an abbot in Romania, by which time 
he seems to have had literally hundreds of monks working on the 
tasks of copying and translation. 
Velichkovsky's Dobrotoluhiye was not a complete translation of 
the Greek Philokalia. Only 27 of the 62 works comprising the latter 
were included in copies of the first edition, although a few additional 
texts by Patriarch Kallistos were included . 
2' A second edition was 
published in 1822 (almost 30 years after Velichkovsy's death). A 
further 13 works from the Greek Philokalia were included in the 
second edition and in at least some copies of the first edition. i0 
It is clear that Velichkovsky's interest in patristic works was 
one that he shared with the compilers of the Greek Philokalia and 
also that he knew of their interest. In a letter of uncertain date to 
Archimandrite Theodosius of Sophroniev, Velichkovsky wrote of 
Makarios' fervour and care in the process of seeking out and copying 
patristic books on Mount Athos, a process that led to the publication 
of the Philokalia. ' It is also clear that Velichkovksy's interest in 
these texts predated by many years the assignment by Makarios to 
Nikodimos in 1777 of the task of compiling and editing the Greek 
Philokalia. Whether we may accept the conclusion of the editors 
of the biography of Velichkovsky (written by his disciple Schema- 
monk Metrophanes) that in fact it was Velichkovsky who imparted 
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to Makarios the knowledge of what to look for, the purpose of the 
search, and awareness of the value of the texts would seem much 
more debatable. ' However, it is clear that Velichkovsky's translation 
work began very many years before the Philokalia was published in 
1782. We might speculate that a loose collection of texts existed 
prior to the interests of both Velichkovsky and Makarios. 
Subsequently, the Philokalia was translated into Russian. There 
are widespread references in the literature to an alleged Russian 
translation by Ignatii Brianchaninov (1807-1876), published in 
1857» However, according to Kallistos Ware it would seem that 
this translation does not in fact exist. 34 A Russian translation by 
Theophan the Recluse (1815-1894) was published in Moscow from 
1877-1889 in five volumes, also under the title Dobrotolubiye. 
Theophan35 studied at Kiev Academy and entered monastic orders 
in 1837. After two months he was ordained priest and subsequently 
became a schoolteacher. Like Makarios, he demonstrated an openness 
to western scholarship and was widely read. In 1850 he was appointed 
as a member of the Russian Official Commission to Jerusalem. In the 
course of this work he travelled widely and was able to visit a series of 
ancient libraries, which he found to be neglected and unappreciated. 
He developed a knowledge of French, Arabic, Greek and Hebrew 
which enabled him to read and catalogue the rare manuscripts that 
he found. It would seem that it was at this stage in his life that he 
developed an interest in early ascetic Christian literature. 
In 1859 Theophan became Bishop of Tambov, and then in 1863 
Bishop of Vladimir. In 1866 he became Prior of Vysha monastery. 
Three months later he was released from his responsibilities as 
superior in order to become a recluse and in 1872 he entered 
almost complete seclusion. During his time in seclusion Theophan 
engaged in a prolific correspondence and also published a number 
of important works, including Unseen Warfare (a revision and 
translation of an earlier Greek translation of Lorenzo Scupoli's 
Spiritual Combat and Path to Paradise made by Nikodimos) and 
the Russian Dobrotolubiye. 
Theophan's Dobrotolubiye represented a considerable expansion 
of the Greek Philokalia, from 1.200 to 3.000 pages, published in five 
volumes. 6 Whilst it included a number of additions not to be found 
in the Greek Philokalia it also omitted a number of texts. 37 
The Philokalia was later translated into Romanian by Father 
Dumitru Stän i loae (1903-1993). and published between 1946 and 
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1991 in twelve volumes under the title Filocalia sau culegere din 
scrierile sfintsilor Parintsi. The additions to the Romanian Filocalia 
are even more numerous and extensive .1 
Stäniloae was born and lived his whole life in Romania but 
received theological education in Athens and Munich. He became 
a professor of theology in Bucharest and published 90 books, 275 
theological articles and numerous other translations, reviews, lec- 
tures and other items over a period of some 60 years. " Stäniloae 
had a particular interest in the works of Gregory Palamas. Along 
with many other clergy, he was imprisoned from 1958 to 1963 by 
the communist authorities as a political criminal. Four volumes of 
his translation of the Philokalia, based on the first two volumes of 
the Greek Philokalia, were published prior to this imprisonment, 
during the period 1946 to 1948. The fifth volume did not appear 
until 1976. However, after the translation of the Greek Philokalia 
was completed (with the publication of the eighth volume in 1979)4° 
Stäniloae continued to work on four more volumes, incorporating 
works by a number of authors not included in the original Greek 
version. 41 
Modern translations of the Greek texts of the Philokalia have 
also appeared in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Finnish 
and Arabic, and the Greek text may now be consulted in a modern 
fifth edition. 42 
If our speculation that a loose collection of texts already existed 
prior to 1777 is correct, then the apparently free additions of texts 
to Russian and Romanian translations might be taken to suggest 
something of a living tradition. Within this tradition, additions to a 
core Philokalia were apparently either not considered inappropriate, 
or else were thought necessary because of unavailability of the sup- 
porting texts that would originally have been found alongside the 
Philokalia in the library of Mount Athos. 4' 
2. Anthropology 
In his Republic, Plato (c. 347-247 B. C. E. ) argues for a tripartite 
understanding of the human soul or mind (ruXY ). °' Both in the 
course of Plato's argument, and also in our own experience, two 
of these elements are easier to understand than the third. All three 
are more akin to motives than to "parts" in any anatomical sense. 
The first is reason, a reflective and rational element (7AoywtucÖV). 
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The second is irrational appetite (('nL9uµTJrLK6v) - which includes 
desires such as hunger, thirst and sexual drive, orientated towards 
satisfaction and pleasure. The third (9uµLKÖV), including apparently 
varied motives such as anger, indignation, ambition and a sense 
of what is ""in the heart'", the so-called "incensive" power, might 
be translated "spirited'" - although the use of such a theologically 
loaded word in the present context would inevitably be confusing. 
For Plato, the immortal soul was understood as being imprisoned, 
during this life, in its physical body. 
The Platonic understanding of the soul has been very influential 
upon Christianity in general, and in particular the tripartite model 
of the soul appears to have influenced the Philokalia, almost from 
beginning to end. However, before we give consideration to this in 
more detail, it is important to say something about the relationship 
between body and soul. 
The Philokalia not infrequently, but perhaps mainly in its earlier 
texts, refers to an apparently tripartite model of human beings, 
usually as body, soul and spirit, or as body, soul and intellect. Thus. 
for example, in the text attributed to Antony the Great (but probably 
actually of Stoic origin), and placed as the first text in the original 
Greek Philokalia, we find: 
Life is the union and conjuncture between intellect, soul 
and body, while death is not the destruction of these 
elements so conjoined, but the dissolution of their inter- 
relationship; for they are all saved through and in God., 
even after this dissolution. ` 
Again, in Evagrios: 
Let the virtues of the body lead you to those of the soul, 
and the virtues of the soul to those of the spirit. and these, 
in turn, to immaterial and principial knowledge. " 
However, this impression of a tripartite anthropology appears to be 
either unrepresentative or illusory as there seem to be many more 
references to human beings as simply body and soul (or, sometimes. 
body and intellect), 47 and it is clear that this is because the spirit. 
or intellect, is seen as being merely a part of the soul. Thus. for 
example, in the aforementioned text attributed to Anton}' we find: 
The body, when it is united with the soul, comes from 
the darkness of the womb into the light. But the soul, 
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when it is united with the body, is bound up in the 
body's darkness. Therefore we must hate and discipline 
the body as an enemy that fights against the soul. " 
In fact, although it was clearly believed by the original compilers 
to be an authentic work of Antony, the English translators of the 
Philokalia have placed this work in an appendix on the basis that 
there is no evidence of Christian authorship, but rather that it appears 
to be a collection of Stoic and Platonic texts written between the 
first and fourth centuries C. E. (The negative Platonic view of the 
soul as imprisoned in the body is clearly evident here. ) However, the 
understanding of human beings as body and soul seems to provide 
the generally pervading anthropology of the Philokalia, and the 
tension between the body and soul is often evident. For example, in 
Theoretikon, [Theodoros the Great Ascetic] writes: 
What, then, is the nature of our contest in this world? 
The intelligent soul is conjoined with an animal-like 
body, which has its being from the earth and gravitates 
downwards. It is so mixed with the body that though they 
are total opposites they form a single being. Without 
change or confusion in either of them, and with each 
acting in accordance with its nature, they compose a 
single person, or hypostasis, with two complete natures. 
In this composite two-natured being, man, each of his 
natures functions in accordance with its own particular 
powers. It is characteristic of the body to desire what 
is akin to it. This longing for what is akin to them is 
natural to created beings, since indeed their existence 
depends on the intercourse of like with like, and on 
their enjoyment of material things through the senses. 
Then, being heavy, the body welcomes relaxation. 
These things are proper and desirable for our animal- 
like nature. But to the intelligent soul, as an intellective 
entity, what is natural and desirable is the realm of 
intelligible realities and its enjoyment of them in the 
manner characteristic of it. Before and above all what 
is characteristic of the intellect is an intense longing 
for God. It desires to enjoy Him and other intelligible 
realities, though it cannot do this without encountering 
obstacles. 49 
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Elsewhere, the tension between body and soul is even more 
marked, as in the reference by Theognostos to "war between body and 
soul", " or else more positively construed, as in Peter of Damaskos: 
We should marvel, too, at how the body, that is not 
its own animating principle, is, at God's command, 
commixed with the noetic and deiform soul, created by 
the Holy Spirit breathing life into it (cf. Gen. 2: 7). 5' 
Here, and in other places, 52 the relationship between body and soul 
is seen as parallel to that between God and human beings. God/ 
soul provides the "animating principle" or life to that which would 
otherwise be inanimate or lifeless. Similarly, in Gregory Palamas, 
the divine quality of the soul, albeit set in contrast to the material 
nature of the body, is emphasised in the context of the doctrine of 
creation: 
So great was the honour and providential care which 
God bestowed upon man that He brought the entire 
sensible world into being before him and for his sake. 
The kingdom of heaven was prepared for him from the 
foundation of the world (cf. Matt. 25: 34); God first took 
counsel concerning him, and then he was fashioned 
by God's hand and according to the image of God (cf. 
Gen. 1: 26-27). God did not form the whole of man from 
matter and from the elements of this sensible world, as 
He did the other animals. He formed only man's body 
from these materials; but man's soul He took from things 
supracelestial or, rather, it came from God Himself 
when mysteriously He breathed life into man (cf. Gen. 
2: 7). The human soul is something great and wondrous, 
superior to the entire world; it overlooks the universe 
and has all things in its care; it is capable of knowing 
and receiving God, and more than anything else has the 
capacity of manifesting the sublime magnificence of the 
Master-Craftsman. Not only capable of receiving God 
and His grace through ascetic struggle, it is also able to 
be united in Him in a single hypostasis. 53 
This vision of the divine soul in union with a physical body created 
by God is in tension, however, with the condition of the soul and 
body as they exist after "the fall''. Thus, Gregory of Sinai writes: 
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When God through His life-giving breath created the soul 
deiform and intellective, He did not implant in it anger 
and desire that are animal-like. But He did endow it with a 
power of longing and aspiration, as well as with a courage 
responsive to divine love. Similarly when God formed 
the body He did not originally implant in it instinctual 
anger and desire. It was only afterwards, through the fall, 
that it was invested with these characteristics that have 
rendered it mortal, corruptible and animal-like. For the 
body, even though susceptive of corruption, was created, 
as theologians will tell us, free from corruption, and that is 
how it will be resurrected. In the same way the soul when 
originally created was dispassionate. But soul and body 
have both been denied, commingled as they are through 
the natural law of mutual interpenetration and exchange. 
The soul has acquired the qualities of the passions or, 
rather, of the demons; and the body, passing under the 
sway of corruption because of its fallen state, has become 
akin to instinct-driven animals. The powers of body and 
soul have merged together and have produced a single 
animal, driven impulsively and mindlessly by anger and 
desire. That is how man has sunk to the level of animals, 
as Scripture testifies, and has become like them in every 
respect (cf. Ps. 49: 20). 5' 
Much of what the Philokalia has to tell us about the inner life 
depends upon this basic anthropology of body and soul created by 
God in union with each other, but also in tension with each other; 
fundamentally good, but also fundamentally distorted and corrupted 
by the fall. Whilst, as we have seen already, there are variations in 
emphasis amongst different contributors to the Philokalia, which is 
only as one would expect, this basic understanding seems to pervade 
the texts. Sometimes the emphasis is more on the goodness of 
creation, sometimes more on its corruption as a result of the sin of 
Adam. The sense of tension between body and soul, and within the 
soul, is however more or less ubiquitous. 
As for the soul itself, the tripartite Platonic model is adopted 
throughout, almost completely without any deviation or dissent. 55 
In English translation, these parts are usually rendered as the 
"intellect" or "intelligence", the "desiring"' or "appetitive" power, 
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and the "incensive" power. The latter two are often referred 
to as the "passible", or irrational, aspects of the soul, implying 
greater vulnerability to passion (irä9oc - about which, more later). 
However, this does not imply that the intellect or intelligence is 
not also susceptible to passion, and the passions are sometimes 
classified according to which of these three parts of the soul they 
primarily affect. 
At this point, various clarifications are required, for things are 
not quite as simple as has been portrayed so far. In particular, the 
nature and terminology of Plato's "'rational" element of the soul, as 
understood by the authors of the Philokalia, requires some further 
elaboration. According to the glossary in the English translation of the 
Philokalia, this part of the soul is to be referred to as the "intelligent" 
(A. oywtuKÖv) aspect or "intel I igence" (;. oyLKÖV). However, in practice, 
the authors of the Philokalia often also refer to it as the "intellect"' 
(voüc). 5` Furthermore, both of these terms are clearly distinguished 
from "reason" (&&VOua), a term which is never used by authors of 
the Philokalia as a name for this part of the soul. 57 
Reason is clearly distinguished from intellect and intelligence. 
As the translators and editors of the English edition make clear in 
their glossary, it is: 
the discursive, conceptualizing and logical faculty in 
man, the function of which is to draw conclusions or 
formulate concepts deriving from data provided either 
by revelation or spiritual knowledge (q. v. ) or by sense- 
observation. The knowledge ofthe reason is consequently 
of a lower order than spiritual knowledge (q. v. ) and does 
not imply any direct apprehension or perception of the 
inner essences or principles (q. v. ) of created beings, still 
less of divine truth itself. Indeed, such apprehension or 
perception, which is the function of the intellect (q. v. ), 
is beyond the scope of the reason. 58 
This becomes clear in, for example, usage of the term by Ilias the 
Presbyter: 
By means of intellection the intellect attains spiritual 
realities; through thought the reason grasps what is 
rational. Sense-perception is involved with practical 
and material realities by means of the fantasy. `' 
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The intellect, however, is described in the English glossary as the 
"highest faculty" possessed by human beings, through which they 
may perceive spiritual realities. Rather than operating through use 
of rational or abstract processes, it discerns Divine truth by direct 
experience or "intuition". It is the means by which human beings 
may engage in contemplation. 60 
In distinction from this, the Greek root of the word for intelligence 
betrays its even closer association with Divine reality - with the Aöyoc 
himself. It is used with reference to the possession of spiritual 
knowledge. It is the "ruling aspect" of the intellect. 61 
Thus, for example, Maximos the Confessor writes, in Various 
Texts: C2: 
Every intellect girded with divine authority possesses 
three powers as its counselors and ministers. First, 
there is the intelligence. It is intelligence which gives 
birth to that faith, founded upon spiritual knowledge, 
whereby the intellect learns that God is always present 
in an unutterable way, and through which it grasps, 
with the aid of hope, things of the future as though they 
were present. Second, there is desire. It is desire which 
generates that divine love through which the intellect, 
when of its own free will it aspires to pure divinity, is 
wedded in an indissoluble manner to this aspiration. 
Third, there is the incensive power. It is with this power 
that the intellect cleaves to divine peace and concentrates 
its desire on divine love. Every intellect possesses these 
three powers, and they cooperate with it in order to 
purge evil and to establish and sustain holiness. 62 
Here, intelligence, desire and the incensive power represent the 
three powers of the intellect, where "intellect" appears effectively 
to be synonymous with "soul". 63 Elsewhere, the intellect is distin- 
guished from the soul, 6' or else described as being in various other 
relationships to it. It is referred to as being in the depths of the soul, 65 
as being the "eye of the soul", ' as being "the pilot of the soul-1,67 as 
being "consubstantial" with the soul, 68 the illumination of the SOU 1,69 
and as capable of being united with the soul. 70 The relationship is 
therefore not a simple one, and the descriptions of it, at least in the 
Philokalia, do not appear to be entirely consistent. 
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The place of intelligence, however, is to restrain the intellect and 
the passions, " to contemplate virtue, '2 and to cleave to God himself. 73 
But this purpose can only be fully understood in the context of the 
incarnation of the Aöyoc who has created, and re-created, all things, 
including the human ; LoyLKÖV: 
The Logos of God, having taken flesh and given our 
nature subsistence in Himself, becoming perfect man, 
entirely free from sin, has as perfect God refashioned 
our nature and made it divine. As Logos of the primal 
Intellect and God, He has united Himself to our 
intelligence, giving it wings so that it may conceive 
divine, exalted thoughts. Because He is fire, He has 
with true divine fire steeled the incensive power of the 
soul against hostile passions and demons. Aspiration of 
all intelligent being and slaker of all desire, He has in 
His deep-seated love dilated the appetitive aspect of the 
soul so that it can partake of the blessings of eternal 
life. Having thus renewed the whole man in Himself, He 
restores it in an act of re-creation that leaves no grounds 
for any reproach against the Creator-Logos. ' 
The Platonic tripartite model of the soul is thus very much in evidence 
in the Philokalia, but it is also clear that it has been utilised for a 
Christian purpose - that of understanding the inner life of human 
beings in the context of the incarnation of God in Christ. 
3. The Desert Fathers 
For three centuries Christians suffered persecution. At first (until 
about 64 C. E. ) this was at the hands of Jewish authorities, then at the 
hands of the Roman empire. Christianity seems widely to have been 
disapproved of in the Roman world, and Christians were referred 
to as "atheists" because of their failure to believe in the Roman 
gods. At times this disapproval was associated with mob violence. 
Successive emperors and governments made it a capital offence to 
be a Christian, banished Christians, confiscated their property, sent 
them into the arena to fight as gladiators, tortured and imprisoned 
them. Churches and copies of scripture were burned. Periods of 
respite were brief, until in 311 Galerius, Caesar of the east, issued 
an Edict of Toleration. Although his successor Maximinus attempted 
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to counteract this edict, his efforts were largely ineffective and in 
3 13 he also issued notices of toleration. Emperors in the west, first 
Maxentius and then Constantine, followed suit and in 313 the latter 
drew up an edict of toleration similar to that of Galerius. 7S 
It is perhaps hard for many Christians today to imagine what 
it must have been like to live, and die, under the persecution 
experienced by Christians during these first three centuries, although 
it is also easy to exaggerate. For example, persecution of Christians 
in Russia in the twentieth century might arguably have been much 
worse. Nonetheless, many died, and some renounced their faith. 
Many, but not all, lived on the social edges of society. For them, the 
injunction of Jesus that they should deny themselves and take up 
their crosses and follow him can hardly have seemed metaphorical. 76 
It would seem also that such Christian communities lived in eager 
anticipation of the expected return of Christ. In this context, there 
is evidence that from the early third century C. E. onwards some 
Christians, although at this stage they should not be considered to 
have adopted a "monastic" life, deliberately chose a poor, celibate 
and ascetic lifestyle in order that they may devote themselves more 
fully to their Christian vocation as they understood it. 77 
At the beginning of the fourth century C. E., with the edicts of 
toleration, and then the adoption of Christianity by Constantine, 
everything changed. Christianity was now a legal and acceptable 
part of the fabric of society. Undoubtedly, many Christians found 
this difficult to accommodate. Increasingly, some - perhaps many 
- chose to retreat into the deserts of Syria, Palestine, and especially 
Egypt, where they could devote themselves to prayerful waiting for 
the return of Christ. 78 One contemporary account states: 
One can see them in the desert waiting for Christ as 
loyal sons watching for their father.... There is only the 
expectation of the coming of Christ in the singing of 
hymns.... There is no town or village in Egypt and the 
Thebaid which is not surrounded by hermitages as if by 
walls. 79 
Many of these Christians lived as solitary hermits - perhaps most 
famously Antony of Egypt, whose subsequently highly influential life 
was written by Athanasius. 80 Others lived in coenobitic communities, 
and from this developed a Christian tradition of monasticism which 
eventually, at least partly through the influence of John Cassian 
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(c. 365-c. 433), had an important influence upon the whole western 
European monastic tradition. ' 
Amongst the desert hermits, coenobites and monks of the 
fourth and fifth centuries C. E., there developed a focus on the inner 
life - upon the presence of sin in the human heart, the need for 
forgiveness, virtue in human living, and prayer. Many, perhaps most, 
of these Christians were not learned. Their focus was upon a simple, 
practical, life of prayer and certainly not on writing or academic 
study. Indeed, the impression is sometimes given that writing and 
study were positively frowned upon. 82 However, various kinds of 
literature did emerge from this tradition. " In particular, there are 
the "Lives" of various saints (especially that of Antony of Egypt by 
Athanasius, c. 355-362), accounts of travels to the Egyptian desert 
(especially the Lausiac History, c. 419/420, and the History of the 
Monks of Egypt, c. 394/395), various kinds of instructional literature 
(notably that by Evagrios and Cassian), and letters from various 
authors (including seven by Antony of Egypt and 14 by Ammonas). 
The pinnacle of traditional monastic literature, however, is to be 
found in the sayings, proverbs and anecdotes of those who lived 
in the Egyptian desert, which were recorded, edited and passed on. 
Collections of these sayings appeared in the late fifth century and 
in the sixth century, which are now known as the ". Sayings of the 
Desert Fathers"' or the Apophthegmata Patrum. " 
The life of the Desert Fathers was severe. They lived in small huts 
or caves and undertook basic manual work such as rope or basket 
making. They ate and drank extremely little, they forsook sleep in 
favour of prayer and, of course, they gave up the possibilities of 
marriage and family life. Renouncing of material possessions was a 
fundamental step, and most did not even have a copy of the Bible, 
but would rely for prayer and meditation on such passages as they 
had committed to memory. Most of their time would be spent alone, 
and remaining alone in ones cell was often emphasised as being of 
fundamental importance to the spiritual life. $5 
Sayings that have been handed down frequently take the form 
of a question - usually posed by a visitor or by a more junior 
brother to an older and wiser "Abba" or, in some cases, '`Amma". 
The responses given to such questions vary between the obscure, 
profound, apparently rude, and extremely harsh. Because they are 
usually located in particular circumstances, many of which were not 
be recorded, different sayings can also appear contradictory of each 
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other. However, they also reflect extreme humility, compassion, wis- 
dom and, at least sometimes, humour. 
In some ways, the Philokalia and the sayings of the Desert Fathers 
are worlds apart. A five-volume anthology hardly compares with 
a largely oral tradition that had a suspicion of books and learning. 
However, possession of the Philokalia potentially avoids the need to 
own, or have access to, a large library. ' Some of the "centuries" of 
texts in the Philokalia also have a literary quality about them which 
is not dissimilar to that of the Apophthegmata Pairum. They have 
similar ascetic concerns, they both appear to be intended as a basis 
for prayer and living, rather than academic study, and they employ a 
not dissimilar terminology of the inner life of thought and prayer and 
virtue. 
Thus, for example, we might compare Abba Theonas and 
Hesychios the Priest on prayer and the passions: 
Abba Theonas said, "When we turn our spirit from the 
contemplation of God, we become the slaves of carnal 
passions. 
Whereas, in Watchfulness & Holiness by Hesychios, we find: 
Contemplation and spiritual knowledge are indeed the 
guides and agents of the ascetic life; for when the mind 
is raised up by them it becomes indifferent to sensual 
pleasures and to other material attractions, regarding 
them as worthless. " 
Such common ground should, of course, not be surprising. Apart from 
the general observation that the Desert Fathers might be considered 
the founders of Christian monasticism or, if this is debated, at least 
that they influenced its subsequent course very considerably, and 
that the Philokalia emerged from that same monastic tradition, there 
are also more direct links to be found. 
At least three of the earlier authors of the Philokalia had in fact 
lived in the Egyptian desert themselves. Isaiah the Solitary was 
probably not the contemporary of Makarios of Egypt that Nikodimos 
considered him to be, but probably did live at Sketis in Egypt in the 
fifth century C. E., before moving to Palestine, and therefore can be 
said to represent firsthand experience of the tradition of the Desert 
Fathers. R9 Evagrios of Pontus went to Egypt in 383 C. E. and spent 
the remaining 16 years of his life first at Nitria and then at Kellia. 
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During this time he was a disciple of Makarios the Great (also 
known as Makarios of Egypt) and also had contact with Makarios 
of Alexandria. " John Cassian lived in Egypt from c. 385/6 to 399, 
during which time he was a disciple of Evagrios. He subsequently 
travelled to Constantinople and then spent the remainder of his life 
in the west. He founded two monasteries in Marseilles and wrote 
two books, The Institutes and The Conferences, based upon his 
experiences in the Egyptian desert, abbreviated parts of which are 
included in the Philokalia. 91 Although between them these three 
authors contribute a little less than a third of only the first volume of 
the Philokalia, they are the first three books in the English translation 
and are the earliest contributors. 
In addition to Isaiah, Evagrios and Cassian, it seems likely 
that Mark the Ascetic also spent some time living as a hermit in 
the desert, although in fact we know very little about him. 92 The 
Philokalia also includes a paraphrase by Symeon Metaphrastis of 
homilies that purport to be by Makarios the Great, whose sayings fea- 
ture prominently in the Apophthegmata Patrum. However, it would 
now seem highly unlikely that Makarios was in fact the author of 
these hom il ies. 93 Similarly, it is of note that the opening work of the 
original Greek Philokalia was one attributed to Antony the Great. 
Although this is now known not to have been written by Antony of 
Egypt, it would seem reasonable to assume that it may have suited 
the compilers of the Philokalia very well to place first in their work 
a text by this most famous of the Desert Fathers. 
In addition to the contributions to the Philokalia by those who 
had firsthand experience of the desert tradition, it is clear that there 
is a more pervasive influence. For example, Peter of Damaskos 
(whose works effectively provide a "mini-Philokalia" within 
the Philokalia) quotes the Desert Fathers some 30 times, " and 
Nikiphoros the Monk quotes from the lives of a number of the 
Desert Fathers in Watchfulness & Guarding. q" The Desert Fathers 
also exerted an indirect influence on writers such as Maximos 
the Confessor, the single largest contributor to the Philokalia, 
although this is not always explicitly acknowledged. " But perhaps 
the most important direct and indirect influence comes from the 
perceptiveness of Evagrios of Pontus. There can be little doubt that 
his spirituality and psychology influenced all the subsequent writers 
whose works were included in the Philokalia. 97 - It is therefore to 
Evagrios that we must turn next. 
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4. Evagrios of Pontus 
If you are a theologian, you will pray truly; and if you 
pray truly, you will be a theologian. 9R 
Evagrios was born in Pontus, in Cappadocia, but moved in 379 to 
Constantinople where he studied under Gregory Nazianzen. " By this 
time he was possibly already a monk. Although, up until this time, 
he appears to have shown much promise as a theologian, he left the 
city in 382 having begun an affair, albeit perhaps unconsummated, 
with the wife of a prominent local figure. Fleeing to Jerusalem he 
came close to abandoning his monastic vocation altogether, but was 
persuaded not to by Melania the Elder, a prominent Roman widow 
and foundress of a double monastery. Perhaps also with her encour- 
agement, Evagrios left Jerusalem in 383 for the Egyptian desert, 
where he was to remain (apart from brief excursions to Alexandria 
and elsewhere) until his death. 
Evagrios spent his first two years in Egypt in the desert at Nitria, 
one of the major monastic centres of the time. He then retired to 
the even more remote centre of Kellia, where he became a pupil of 
Makarios the Great, one of the most famous of the Desert Fathers. 
During his time here he subjected himself to a severe regime, which 
probably damaged his health. He would sleep only four hours each 
night, walking back and forth and keeping himself occupied in order 
to remain awake during the day. When subject to sexual temptation 
he once spent an entire night in mid-winter praying naked standing 
in a cistern of water. " He ate only once a day, and then only very 
limited foods. 
He remained at Kellia until his death in c. 399. During this time he 
became a respected teacher and, unusually, also the author of a series 
of important works. Amongst these were instructions on the monastic 
li fe (The Foundations of Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice 
of Stillness, "' and The Monk: A treatise on the Practical Life". ), 
numerous commentaries on scripture (including Scholia on Proverbs, 
Ecclesiastes, Job, and Psalms), various letters and most importantly 
for the present purpose some works on prayer and the inner life 
(Chapters on Prayer'°3, On the Eight Thoughts, ' 04 On Thoughts"", 
Antirrhetikos, Gnostikos, and the Kephalaia Gnostica). Some of these 
works106 survive only in Latin, Armenian or Syriac translation. 
During his lifetime, Evagrios remained a respected theologian 
and teacher on the spiritual life. After his death, as the works of 
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Origen were increasingly scrutinised and condemned as heretical. 
Evagrios' reputation began to suffer by association. Despite this, 
his works were widely circulated and translated into Latin, Coptic, 
Syriac, Arabic and various other languages. Eventually, Origen was 
condemned at the Second Ecumenical Council in 553, as were a 
series of beliefs held by Evagrios, and many copies of his works 
were subsequently destroyed. 107 Despite this, Evagrios' insights into 
prayer, the inner life and asceticism were still widely appreciated 
and were read and developed by others. That it was possible that 
this could happen was partly because his so-called theological works 
were separated from his ascetic and spiritual works, partly because 
of wide dissemination and translation, and also because some works 
were transmitted under other names (as indeed originally happened 
with one of his contributions to the Philokalia). 
i. Foundations 
Taught by Makarios, Evagrios shared with the Desert Fathers 
a belief that inner stillness, hesychia, was facilitated by avoiding 
frequent or inappropriate social contacts. or any other external 
circumstances which might provide unnecessary agitation or dis- 
traction. " In Foundations he sets out the basics: celibacy, poverty. 
a frugal diet, living either alone or with like-minded brothers in 
the desert, avoidance of cities, infrequent contact with family and 
friends, undertaking basic manual labour so as not to be a burden 
on others, but avoidance of buying and selling where at all possible. 
and sleeping little and only on the ground. All these matters were. 
however, merely preliminary. His real concern was with the inner 
world of thoughts and it is here that he showed himself to be highly 
psychologically insightful and original. These "foundations'" of the 
monastic life are put in place in order to attain and preserve an inner 
state of "stillness""1°'(ryauxL'a) and this in turn is preparatory to other 
things, which he deals with in his other works. 
ii. Eight Thoughts 
In Eight Thoughts, Evagrios deals in turn with eight thoughts, or 
kinds of thoughts, each of which presents to the Christian a point 
of potential struggle or temptation. The material is presented as a 
series of brief paragraphs, often only one sentence long, under each 
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heading. These paragraphs take the form of proverbs, aphorisms, 
or wise sayings, or else admonitions and instructions. Allegory and 
metaphor are used liberally. Reference to, and quotation of, scripture 
is used to illustrate and justify, but some whole sections of the 
discourse (specifically on fornication and acedia) do not explicitly 
refer to scripture at all. Whilst the texts have a certain quality 
reminiscent of the sayings of the Desert Fathers, and presumably 
must have been derived, at least in part, from the same underlying 
oral tradition, the Fathers are not explicitly quoted. The texts appear 
to be offered for contemplation and reflection - to be prayed over and 
lived out rather than studied systematically in an academic fashion. 
One is left with the impression that they arise in turn from Evagrios' 
own reflections, and those of his mentors. 
The list, which appears elsewhere in Evagrian work and is 
original to Evagrios, has been highly influential upon other authors - 
including authors of the Philokalia. Elsewhere, Evagrios states that 
"All the generic types of thoughts fall into [these] eight categories 
in which every sort of thought is included. ""' The list comprises the 
following: 
1. Gluttony 
2. Fornication 
3. Avarice 
4. Anger 
5. Sadness 
6. Aced is 
7. Vainglory 
8. Pride 11 
The title of this work refers to these items as being "thoughts", but 
in other works (e. g. On the Vices opposed to the Vrtues) they are 
referred to as vices, and in each case there is at least some reference 
here to an opposing virtue. In places the thoughts are also referred 
to as "passions" (e. g. Gluttony, #3; Fornication, #12; Avarice, #]). 
In other works (e. g. Praktikos), but interestingly not here, Evagrios 
refers to demons using the same names. 
Gluttony, fornication and avarice are all concerned with desires 
that affect the concupiscible or appetitive aspect of the soul. "' Anger 
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is concerned with "a boiling over" 112 of the irascible part of the soul. 
Elsewhere, Evagrios makes clear that sadness, vainglory and pride 
arise in the intelligent aspect of the soul, and that acedia arises from 
both the passible and intelligent aspects of the soul. "3 
Table 1.1 (pages 26-29) summarises Evagrios' teaching on the 
eight thoughts. In each case, Evagrios proves to be a perceptive 
and diligent student, who has analysed the root causes, nature and 
consequences of the particular kind of thought. Gluttony is a fire 
fuelled by food, fornication is a wind that throws the ship of the 
soul off course, and avarice sinks that ship by weight of possessions. 
Anger is a form of madness, impairing the intellect, and sadness, 
which arises from frustration of anger or desire, is all consuming 
and all encompassing, like a devouring lion, or a prisoner's bonds. 
Acedia is a wind that bends a delicate plant, but Evagrios notes that a 
wind also has the potential to strengthen a growing plant. Vainglory 
is the bindweed that saps away life, and the rock which causes 
shipwreck. Pride is a wound or infection that requires treatment by 
cautery or a scalpel if it is to be cured. Each of these thoughts, if not 
treated correctly, leads to its own particular consequences. They are 
inter-related and mutually reinforcing. 
It is perhaps helpful here to say a little more about sadness and 
acedia, as these might represent more unexpected items in the list, at 
least to contemporary western minds. Evagrios refers to sadness as 
arising as a result of frustration of desire, or else closely following 
anger. 1' It is thus closely related to the other passions, but also similar 
to contemporary accounts of depression. "5 Acedia is "a relaxation of 
the soul which is not in accord with nature". 116 It thus represents a 
lack of commitment to, or perseverance with, the vocation of the 
ascetic life and/or the life of prayer. These thoughts are therefore 
more significant in terms of where they arise from, and what they 
lead to. Like desire for food or sexual fulfilment, it is not so much 
that these thoughts are sinful in themselves - for they are most often 
uninvited - but rather they present temptations to something else. 
Evagrios also proves perceptive in his analysis of various trains 
of thought and sequences of events. Thus, for example, in his section 
on fornication he includes a much longer than usual paragraph (2.8), 
in which he traces the typical course of a series of interactions of 
a monk and a woman. At first encounter, modesty and chastity 
prevail. At a second encounter, the gaze has changed subtly, and at 
a third encounter eye contact has been made. Eventually, the soul is 
; A* 
w; 
ee 
. 
`+C 
h 
gj 
ý. + 
%0- 
ý 
u 
ý 
u 
E 
v 
03 
= 
aý 
. 
ý.. 
ý.: 
ý 
ý 
E.. 
". ý ý, 
'- ^ CV C 
"-. 
ý ... 
V') 
- H 
ü 
, .ý.... = x- 
" - .ý. .L 
v 
_ 
y 
C 
^L 
.. 
ýN 
J .. 
ý+ f 
0 
ý.. 
- C 
" 
4y ^ 
ý 1 
y"r, 
Lyý ýJ... 
i. 
E N 
L 
C :. ý = y ,ý"ýL'O 
C ý` 
ý 
C G 
- LC 
011 
v V; i'- 
ý . 4 
v 
iL Li .- 11 
"J 
.... C 
= 
ý 
- tl 
L 
? `- ý 
_ý 
CE ýO J . f"J 
.r 
Cv 
Z ' 
J 
= 11 i _. ."v Ii` 
. `'+ 
CII 
ý "J 
l 
= 
": 
ý II 
to 
`'7 Sý 
II C 
Ly 
? 
, 
-r 
i' ;: 
L 
-7 2, - 
_ 
- 1- u 
< 
Ix 1 
L Ü 
L 
r 
L. 
L 
C 
O ,_ r,, 
.... r ; t2 v: l, 
. C " >L 
ý 
C, ' 
: - 
M 
.. ý 
.. ý 
.... 
\C 
... 
G .... r, 
;, ý 
ý 
- 
:Q 
ý ^, ,L^ .. 1N 
L L C, 4 2 * 
ý 
- 
ý/ 
y 
.0 1-, 
V. r. r ý. i 
r. n .L .ý 
ýI 
++ "ý 
"0 ý, 
J 
«: 
i""+ 
«. 
L ... L 
.ý 
E Cý4 ov -ze "ý 
, 
C cr% Lý 
tyv 
''ý L 
'7 f= y: 
C " c.: C ,.. :JC ._ 
J" ;, ý 
'1ý CCf 
^CJ ^ý 
G 
C 
C 
O 
ý. 
C "= ý. 
Cl) ý 
.., 
ä 
:.: 
ý 
>> 
C 
V . "". ý. 
C C 
ti 
w 
. -. v 'ý oa 
- ä x v^ c + 
O C 21 ý ý : cý yCy I Q' + 
^ .d 
^ . 
L 
wý 
: wý ýº 
h. 7 .. r 
m 
" 
J. 
" " 
! y 
C 
~y ý _ý 
V L J ý ý ý, 
ý 
E Co % L .... . ... ... C .. Mi. ' 
`ý- r"- 
F 
F 
_ 
l 
~ 1.0 f 
ý 
f 
a[l "J 
G 
i 
,., 1- 
-" - "ag : LS 
J "J f J . , .,.,. Q(! 
f " 
L 
.. C = J > 
C 
; ý % " .. _ .,, ." 
f f Z. L .. 
"º 
) 
f .C ~ 
C ,y " ý ' 
O 
,.., "J ý 
r V , 'L 
Zj . II 
, 
v 
. =C 
J 
IS ý 
:ý 
n' lw V 
C J ý II L III ý L I ýý 
ý 
ý% `I 
II 
wJ 
}- 
11 
"r 
t 
L 
c = 
_ l 
L. 
O E ý 
M 
,:, 
Lv 
"J 
J 
f 
ý 
f 
" 
v 
L 
y 
L 
ý" " r'ý"i !ý ý 
 J .C 
,ý 
"'' 
/: 
C 
_ " 
G 
"". " 
_ 
ý. ý f `ý 
S 
J C L 
.r .. ý - :! 
 
L- V. M . -. u 
S 
_ 
 , 12 
w. ! .ý 
L «r > 
ý 
, -" ý, "-" C "-" C L 
C y ý`, 
ý = .ý ., . 13 
ý"'"" v `n ýý C EaA  .; 
ý ". _ 
ZA 22 .rr 
: /: 3 v J ý" J w 
ý... 
Z. 
Z Z. - 
v "ý c'ü y r. ob 
" 
"L .L 
ý _ 
:. ^ 
... 
C 
. "ý .. 
i, % %r.... 
C ., 
. 
ýý. 
, ^ = ^' 
. _ " 
'l. 
_ 
" ' vC ý "r L. 0 
ir ý 
f 
ý. j 
: v' 
"J 
l- 
J 
(z . y 
L` ;! :d 
- 
% ý ý 
ý 
"J = 
ý _C ý 0l1 
 r O^C 
"ýL :C 
G' w%ýC 
' 
C 
 
v 
Vl. 
v e ý "- M _ 
E- 
` E '' ` ! -. '- % f" - v 
V1 :J C % 
V1 - ; '3 C 
ßr ^ 
v 
.. i.. 
, 
.. ý 
ý. . -. 
y 
rr. 
ýý 
ý' 
v iy . -. 
=_y 
y -- . =t ý3 >> : M : C! = cý L + _ý . 
a% !SL 
,ý +-+ 
L_ 
.v 
"ý' .ý 
cC o 
O 
V "LO ~'' 
" ti"' 
ý 
'L O -+ ý' " CO cr, C 
_ - ý- '- w : 
' v, 
y"J C 
" 
Q 
" 
col :. ý 
C 
L 
y 
y 
y ý ,l 
C: 
cc 
ä 
.-c... 
°c 
«.. 
C 
Cý 
ý 
.ý 
E 
U C. , 3- cz r- :C Gm > y 
v-v ö 
C y 0 n ý 
E 
~ 
y 
'6 
ý 
' " 
C 
s"'C UE 
C II I 
t7 _ 
C ý:. CU C -! - J 0ý 
G. 
O ý, 
ýý ý 
.3 
i 
II y 
ýE 
ý ý ý 
a 3c 
C 
yýc sf "ý y 
y II 
CO 
cc 
C 
II 
II 
ý 
ýý 
L, y" 
Q 
C 
C 
ý. Gc C C 
. 
: ;: 
i i 
: 
i 
C -j ýC 
L 
~ 
C 
,ý 
.r 
C ý `v «. 
N 
C pp 
yC 
` 'y 
ý 
ý = _ý 
Wý 
yý 
-0 f 
O. r.. " 
N 
ýý 
y 
C 
" 
" 
G. C 
C ý y_ 
Q 
cy 
L 
'10 L- 
G. . CZ sE 
Jl 
LG 
yC 
G. ' 
C .ý 
ý 
_ 
ýs , 
v L %) 
" 
«t Tý p(ý y 
3 
UL f`J 
- 0 Q .a % C Q >, Qý V Q"ý cz QL A= Qý 
-.... 
.. ý _, 
v 
ý = GC 
. 
y ýºC. _ -. -G' y 3ýý ý="^ ý r, 
:3L (`- m :% t7'. E 
fy O «. 
M 
Oýý 0 
C 
ý v 
C C' C fý 
+ ý 
C y= 
C 
O . 
y C3 
ý 0[1 ',;, '"'' p ".:. 
ý 
.CC 
.r 4 .. _ UL If` Ö 11 C ^n eC c«- .ý 
0 . y-0 c "-" v co f -- y. 
U` 
- g0 3z ý 
v 
it r!, 
"ý 
-0 
C ý C cl z cn :nyOp -p Ob G C 'Y ý c ýUy yU *- -ý . ý., C CA ', f J t: yU yý Cýy, cd w ., m" J y 
!ýi '5 
«~" CIS ý 
` -- ýMC 
OU Lý 
CL. N 
C" C 
ýi=O, 
QCC 
'A 
Ö 
4 "- . cC . 
C 
cr 
OC 
C 'fl 
" ý 
0. C/: , Q 
Q 
C 
O 
ý 
C 
CC 
ý 
ý 
co 
y 
^ ý «.. 
C 
o-y 
II 
C 4: ý 
"- 
23 
c 
ti 
F 
ý 
Cý[1 
C 
.ý 
ý .. 
"J 
L 
ý 
'l. 
"J 
G 
ý 
`C 
ý 
, 1! ... ý 
.± 
i 
v 
c 
., ý 
t 
.. .ý 
. 
ý 
ý 
ý 
'l. 
.ý 
f'3 
'l. 
'l. 
ý 
. ý. 
Cý 
O 
.ý-ý H 'ý3 C 
V1 
aýJ 
Mi 
:J 
.. + ... 
L 
J 
r- 
....: 4 
:i 
Cr. 
ti 
rr. 
J 
: ts 
C 
:.! 
ý... 
'l. 
wJ 
G 
72 
,., ý.. 
L 
wJ 
-Z 
L 
ý ý 
ý 
.., 
C 
ti ý 
I- 
ý 
.L 
ý 
:C 
"J 
t 
M 
. -, 
CV 
- 
4r, 
.ý 
r 
ILA 
E 
ý ^J 
'r 
Iý 
Lý 
.... ý 
'l, ý. v 
Cýý ýý 
C` 
.. 
ý 
r- 
M 
ý 
.i 
C 
Ný W Yý 
ýJ 
ti 
ý 
ý 
,.. ... 
ý 
C 
ý 
ý ý I- cr 
ý 
'J 
a[1 
C 
.. ý C 
ý 
ý 
., 
aJ 
ý i ý 
C 
M 
W 
ý-. ri 
r 
-v 
.. + 
: 
vA 
L 
ý. + 
ý.. + 
wn 
ý 
.. 0 
; /r. 
xý 
ý. 
a 
'1 
wJ 
Lý 
" 
G. 
4 w 
. ^. Jý C 
> 
ý .. 
oL 
C 
.v 
> 
II 
ý 
J 
ý 
v 
L 
L 
ý 
ý. + 
ý 
"V 
rlý 
TYý 
V 
` 
ýý 
, -. 
G. 
: /. 
" 
ýMl 
` 
Z. 
-, 
ý, oU 
.. 
2E 
a4 ý. 
ý ... 
ý II 
E 
G- 
ý -; -z 
3 ýý ý 
C3 
ý ý 
.. .. 
"r. 
ý 
.' 
ý 
.ý 
s 
... 
.ý 
C 
3 
'r. 
ýýJ e- . r! S .= 14, ,s 
C 
'J 
L 
i 
O 
L(J 
'l. 
ý 
f 
"J 
:r 
.. v 
ý 
Cd 
s ý. r 
ý 
ý 
"/' ý-ý^ 
"- td =' :: ý 'J 
C" ý-ý ý"- 
ý 
_== ýc 
.L CU :a3- 
a[ý 
= 
.ý 
ý 
L 
ý 
.r ... fJ 
ý 
ý 
L 
'J 
ý 
ý 
ý 
C 
tC 
ý 
C 
. ro 
ý 
ý ... 
ý 
r- 
_ 
C 
ý 
L 
. -. T 
r 
ý 
s 
ý 
L 
x 
`., 
ý ý 
t 
.ý 
c 
.ý 
ý 
C' 
.. 
.., 
c 
.ý 
ý 
. 
,c 
c 
ý s 
züi 
ý 
0- 
t 
ý 
«:. 
c... 
:.., 
.. .. L 
ý 
i. 
.i 
ý 
ý 
ý 
". r. 
f 
"ý 
ý 
ýL 
ý 
ý 
. I- ý 
ý ý= 
"r. .ý 
"'ý r ý 
'l, C 
= . ^, 
ý 
"ý 
ýý T1 
:J L 
CC 
, 
'J "' 
.... ýý 
L 
Cr 
L. 
J 
ý 
ý 
ý 
. -. 
oc 
.ý 
ý 
C 
... ý 
,.. "V 
,. v M 
ý 
^ ý ý 
: - .. L 
M 
,y .... 
II 
t: 
ý ý L 
ý 
ý 
> 
7S 
'l. 
"l. 
ý-. 
.. r 
C 
L 
Cü = 
ýý 
G 
rý 
x 
... L. 
iý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
L 
... 
"J 
ý 
s 
.r 
"J 
ý 
.. ý : /. 
"J 
i 
ý... 
, -. T 
... L 
r, 
Ii 
.. + 
.v 
L 
Q. 
w 
^ 
.. r 
C1[J 
ý 
L 
.ý 
C- 
E 
tr.. 
... 
L 
ý.. + 
.. 
ý 
cý ý 
ý ' 'S Gý 
ý -ý 
ýv 
fs 
G, . 
cw 
LJ 
G. - 
v .s cv 
>C 
CL 
,. -. 00 
OC 
011 
x 
... 
.:. 
'l. 
ý.. 
C. 6. 
L 
ý .ý .. C 
c 
ý 
J 
ý 
_J 
L 
s 
f 
... 
... 
v 
ý 
ý 
L 
v. r 
ý 
ý 
v 
ý 
ý 
.' 
"ý 
ýJ 
L. 
.. + 
ý 
ý 
wJ 
ý 
ý. + 
IM 
ý 
ý. r 
ý 
'l. vC 
sü1 
ý 'ý ý 
ý=Cl 
v e3 +J 
$JL.. r 
Cý ^J 
G. ' i. L. C3 
= :r 
ý 
x 
r 
.J 
E 
. ý. ýJ 'l, 
ý_ f :J 
ýL= 
ýJ 
r. n 
ýý 
v 
se 
C' L ,. 
,. 
.. c ,. ., V 
ý. s ý 
.. r 
Ly 
ýG 
t- 
ii :J 
2 L' 
J 
ýº 
ý 
ý"V 
-"S 
ý 
^ ý ý. 
ý ,. ý, 
`» wJ 
ý 
... :. 1 
Uf 
wJ 
wr 
f 
ý- 
' 
= :. J r'.; 
f ý, 
x 
LI 
" 
., .ý= 
ýL 
ý' 
ý, x 
30 The Philokalia and the Inner Life 
besieged by the interaction; it has become "entangling", destructive 
and poisonous. Similarly, in the section on acedia (6.15), he provides 
an amusing account of a monk who is supposed to be reading. But 
this monk finds himself yawning, stretching, looking at the wall, 
counting pages, and jumping to the end. If he gives in to sleep, 
Evagrios observes, then he will find himself awakened by hunger. 
Apparently innocent, or even good, thoughts and actions may 
thus lead to undesirable outcomes. Elsewhere, Evagrios goes further 
and suggests that beneath the apparently innocent thought or action 
there lays another motive. For example: 
A person afflicted with acedia proposes visiting the sick, 
but is fulfilling his own purpose. "' 
Evagrios is not specific here as to whether such a person consciously 
intends proposing visitation of the sick for ulterior purposes. "8 The 
possibility is left open that they might not have insight into their own 
motivation. Thus, being unaware of the dynamics of such thoughts, 
they may be deceiving themselves more than others as to their true 
purpose. However, once having read these passages, it is Evagrios' 
expectation that the monk will no longer be able to claim ignorance of 
what is really going on in his (or, we might add, her) own mind. 
The context and purpose of considering each of these eight 
thoughts is clearly that of facilitating a life of virtue and of prayer. 
Thus, for example, in the section on gluttony we find: 
The smoke of incense sweetens the air, and the prayer 
of the abstinent person presents a sweet odour to God 
(cf. Rev. 8: 4). 19 
Or again, in the section on vainglory: 
Vainglory advises you to pray in the streets, but he who 
wars against it prays in his chamber (cf. Matt. 6: 5-6). 120 
However, the work does not treat of prayer itself, and is generally 
considered to be an introductory work for the monk who is in the 
early stages of monastic life. 
iii. Praktikos 
Praktikos takes things on a further stage. It deals again with the eight 
thoughts, saying a little about the nature of each and then providing 
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more or less brief suggestions for remedies against each of them. 
However, it then develops a more general discussion about the passions 
and the part that sense perceptions and demons play in provoking 
them. This provides the introduction to a series of instructions for 
dealing with these things including, for example, attentiveness to 
ones thoughts, that one might get to know better the tactics of the 
demons. It then moves on to a discussion of impassibility. 
Impassibility (änä6Ft. a), or dispassion as it is usually translated 
in the Philokalia, is concerned with impartiality or detachment, 
with peace or tranquillity, but not with absence of suffering. 121 It is 
translated by Cassian as "purity of heart"'. 122 According to Evagrios, 
impassibility is encountered after victory is gained over the demons/ 
passions. 12' It is the "blossom" of the practical life and, in turn, gives 
birth to love. '24 Although he does not develop the theme here, it is 
also the gateway to the first type of contemplative prayer - that of 
the contemplation of the essence of created beings. 125 
Praktikos closes with further practical advice about the ascetic 
life and then with some sayings of the Desert Fathers. 
iv. On Thoughts 
On Thoughts takes things on a further stage and provides a more 
detailed account of the mental life and especially of the struggle 
against the demons. It is clear that this is all in aid of attaining "pure 
prayer", but again little is said about that in this work. The work 
rather appears to be preparatory for that end; it is written for the 
monk who is striving to achieve impassibility. '`6 
In On Thoughts, three thoughts - those of gluttony, avarice and 
vainglory - are seen as being of fundamental importance. Demons are 
understood as being at work in these thoughts: as suggesting them, 
enticing human beings with them, and as being "entrusted" with 
them. 127 it is these thoughts/demons which open the way to all the 
others and it is these three with which Jesus is understood as having 
been tempted in the wilderness. 12' Further, all demonic thoughts are 
understood as entering the soul through "mental representations of 
sensible objects!,,. 129 It is not all such mental images, or memories, 
that are necessarily demonic, but rather those that are associated 
with "irascibility or concupiscibility contrary to nature". "' In other 
words, these thoughts arouse the desiring and incensive aspects of 
the soul in a way which is likely to lead to sinful behaviour and 
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which prevents the intellect from perceiving the image of God. This 
may happen in sleep as well as in wakefulness. '' 
Thoughts are understood by Evagrios as originating from angels, 
from demons or from the human mind. He uses as an example 
thoughts of gold. Angelic thoughts may be about why God created 
gold, how it is referred to in the Bible and the holy purposes to which 
it may be put. Demonic thoughts will be about selfish acquisition of 
gold and the pleasures that this will bring. Human thoughts neither 
investigate divine purpose, nor indulge selfish passion, but rather 
appear to be a dispassionate imaging of gold by the intellect. 132 
Later, "mental representations", by which he appears to be referring 
to the neutral images that are human thoughts, are metaphorically 
referred to as sheep which have been entrusted to human beings as 
to a shepherd. 13' These sheep are vulnerable to wolves or other wild 
beasts. The extended metaphor becomes a little confusing as it is 
developed because he first refers to wolves as being another kind of 
mental representation (by implication associated inappropriately with 
passion), but then goes on to refer to sheep being snatched by wi ld beasts 
when inappropriately pastured - e. g. when the mental representation 
of a brother is "pastured with hatred". On the one hand it appears that 
he considers wolves to be impassioned mental representations, but on 
the other hand he appears to consider wild beasts to be the potentially 
ravaging activities of the respective parts of the soul - incensive, 
desiring or intellective. It is clear, however, that he considers that the 
incensive and desiring aspects of the soul do have fundamentally good 
purposes. The proper function of the incensive part is to chase off the 
wolves, and the function of the desiring part is to nurture the sheep. 
Although he does not explicitly say so here, it is also more or less 
implicit that the proper function of the intellect is prayer. 
In On Thoughts, Evagrios also introduces some new demons. 
Amongst these are "vagabond" and "insensibility". '3' Each is attrib- 
uted, as are all the demons, with purposeful motivation to lead the 
soul away from God. The former does this by means of wandering, 
purposeless and irrelevant thoughts which at first simply occupy the 
mental space which otherwise might have been taken by knowledge 
of God, and then lead on to other thoughts, or rather demons, which 
more directly lead away from virtue and from God. The latter acts 
by diminishing the soul's sense of the seriousness of sin and of the 
fear of God. Later in this work, Evagrios also develops an account 
of the strategies of the demons, especially giving consideration to 
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the circumstances of the monk who has been in combat with them 
for some time. For example, he talks of the way in which they 
follow in succession in their assaults - stronger ones following on 
from weaker ones - and of how they may change their tactic from 
(for example) a temptation to gluttony to a temptation to excessive 
asceticism. 135 (Such a temptation is still put into the mind by the 
demon of gluttony; it is simply gluttony in another form. ) 
The purpose of Evagrios' account of the demons is to arm the monk 
to fight against them. Thus, for example, he encourages his reader to be 
self-reflective about where his thoughts are led by "vagabond", in order 
that he can more easily recognise his influence, expose it and resist 
it. ' 6 Similarly, if a demon introduces a thought of avarice, the reader is 
encouraged to analyse the way in which it is not the object itself, or the 
mind or the mental representation of the object that is sinful, but rather 
a hostile desire to put the object to an improper use. '37 
Impassibility is seen here as being more nearly attainable than 
it was in Praktikos. For example, advice is given about how to test 
whether or not it has been attained. 13' There is also a concluding 
account of the need for freedom from mental representations as a 
pre-requisite for contemplative prayer. 139 Contemplative prayer (or 
more correctly "pure'' prayer) is the goal towards which Evagrios 
has been leading his pupils and which is now coming into sight. His 
treatment of this for his more advanced pupils is first contained in 
On Prayer, a work which was originally included in the Philokalia 
under attribution to Neilos of Ancyra. 
v. On Prayer 
Prayer is defined by Evagrios as ``a communion of the mind with 
God""" and as 'the ascent of the mind towards God, -. '4' His vision of 
prayer is much broader than these succinct definitions might appear 
to imply. In fact, he sees it as taking in the whole breadth of the 
ascetic life. However, at its heart, "true prayer" or "pure prayer' is the 
goal of the ascetic life and is something that is not easily attained. 
For Evagrios. "the way of prayer ... 
is 
... twofold: 
it involves the 
practical on the one hand and the contemplative on the other'. '' 
The practical life, as understood by Evagrios, is concerned with 
overcoming the "thoughts" (or vices, or passions) that he has dealt 
with at some length in his other works, and especially in Praktikos, 
as described above. '43 It represents a struggle against the demons, 
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the outcome of which is impassibility. 144 It paves the way for 
contemplative prayer, 145 
Contemplative prayer is understood by Evagrios as comprising nat- 
ural contemplation and theological contemplation. 146 Although these 
kinds of contemplation are nowhere precisely defined in On Prayer, 
it is already fairly clear here that natural contemplation is concerned 
with contemplation of natural, or created, beings, and theological 
contemplation is concerned with contemplation of God himself. The 
distinction between these is very important. In comparison with the 
latter, the former hardly qualifies as prayer at all. Thus, for example. 
Evagrios warns that natural contemplation can lead the mind "far 
away from God". j47 Indeed, natural contemplation is eventually 
incompatible with the contemplation of God himself. Contemplation 
of God is free of the images and intellections associated with created 
things. 14' Natural contemplation is contemplation of the many, 
theological contemplation is contemplation of the One. 149 
On Prayer thus begins with a consideration of the practical life 
insofar as it relates directly to the subject of prayer. This includes a 
reminder of the need to attend to the virtues, ' S0 the merit of tears, ' 5' 
the need to avoid distractionsj52 and anger, 153 and the likelihood that 
the demons wi 11 oppose the efforts of the monk to pray. ' S4 The reader 
is enjoined not to pray for his' 55 own needs, but rather that God's 
will be done. 1S6 However, all of this is, yet again, merely preliminary 
to the task in hand. 
Prayer, Evagrios tells us, is all about God. Prayer is about loving 
God, being in communion with God, ' 57 being near to God, ' 58 
beholding the ``place of God"', 151 longing for God, 160 and journeying 
with God. 161 Prayer is bestowed by God. 162 
If God himself is the destination of a journey then the journey 
begins with pursuit of virtue, in order to get to the place of natural 
contemplation, which in turn leads to the contemplation of the Logos 
himself. 161 Prayer is a focus on God which is blind to all distractions. 
Initially, and most fundamentally, these distractions are from the 
passions, but as the soul draws nearer to God it becomes blind even 
to the distractions offered by natural contemplation of corporeal, 
or even incorporeal, beings. '64 And so, Evagrios turns at last to the 
focus of pure prayer, which is God himself. 
He warns that God cannot be contemplated in the form of any 
image. 16' God is immaterial, without quantity or form. Attempts 
to approach God in this way are therefore either misguided human 
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effort, or demonically inspired. On the other hand. for the soul that 
is receptive, God graciously bestows prayer, sending his angels 
to oppose demonic activity, to provide illumination and to instil 
"knowledge of true prayer". 166 Whilst this appears to be the climax of 
Evagrios' On Traver, it can easily feel as though it is an anti-climax. 
Pure prayer remains an unimaginable and undescribed mystery for it 
is communion with God who is imageless. and the imageless cannot 
be imagined or described. Whilst there is much that can be done to 
make the soul receptive to God, pure prayer is ultimately the gift of 
God and so Evagrios urges patience. 16 
Perhaps this accounts for the shift of focus at this point to 
something that sounds at first as though it ought to have been in 
Lesson I -the matter ofpsalmody. 168 Psalmody, Evagrios urges, "puts 
the passions to sleep"' 169 and prepares the mind for prayer. Although 
he implies here that it is a form of natural contemplation, he clearly 
sees this as being a good way to maintain a patient readiness for God 
to bestow theological contemplation or pure prayer. "' But there is 
some ambiguity, for psalmody is both something which he urges 
his reader practise, and also something which, like pure prayer. is 
graciously bestowed by God. ''' 
The structure of the work from this point on is curious. Sinkewicz. 
in his translation, groups together paragraphs 89 to 105 under the 
heading of "Trials'", paragraphs 106 to 112 under the heading of 
"Apophthegmata" and then 113-153 as a concluding miscellany. The 
Apophthegmata might be taken as undergirding what has gone before 
with the authority of the Desert Fathers or, perhaps more likely, as 
providing examples to encourage patience and perseverance. The 
other paragraphs provide a return to earlier themes - such as the 
need to be wary of the attacks of the demons. and the imagelessness 
of true prayer. Perhaps these also are offered as encouragements 
to perseverance, even when the path towards prayer seems to be 
opposed by demons and when their proffered images of God might 
appear seductive. Whatever the intention may have been, the work 
ends on a positive note: 
When you have passed beyond every other joy in your 
prayer. then you have truly discovered the practice of 
prayer. ' 72 
After the battle with the passions is won, when the demons have 
been defeated, when patience has been rewarded by God's gracious 
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bestowal of prayer, when the seduction of that which can be 
imagined and described has been rebuffed, the "theology" that is 
the contemplation of God in prayer offers more joy than anything 
else possibly could. It is clear, however, that this is still just the 
beginning. 
vi. Gnostikos 
In Gnostikos, we learn more. It appears to have been intended as part ofa 
trilogy - Praktikos, Gnostikos, and Kephalaia Gnostika. 
' 73 It comprises 
50 chapters, which are devoted largely to the subject of contemplative 
knowledge, for this is the primary concern of the "gnostikos", the "one 
who knows". However, this is not to say that the practical or ascetical 
life can now be forgotten. There are repeated reminders against such 
things as anger, ' 74 sadness, 175 avarice, 176 vainglory, ' 77 and gluttony. ' 78 
Vice and virtue are still important concerns. 17' Knowledge cannot be 
acquired by one who is still immersed in the passions. 180 
According to Gnostikos, there are two kinds of knowledge: that 
derived by the senses from the external, material, world, and that 
derived interiorly by grace. 181 Gnostikos is concerned, however, 
not so much with these kinds of knowledge in themselves, as with 
what might be expected of the gnostikos. In addition to exhortations 
about vice and virtue, which have already been mentioned, advice is 
given on what may or may not be said to others, 18' and on what it is 
"necessary" or "good" to know. 181 Interestingly, speaking about God 
"without [careful] consideration" is warned against. 184 However, 
in contrast, Evagrios apparently considers it important to advise 
on "causes of abandonment" or reasons why God might withdraw 
from the soul for its own good. These include the revealing of 
virtue, punishment which leads to renewal of virtue, the salvation of 
others, humility, and hatred of evil. ' 85 Evagrios warns against going 
beyond one's knowledge, or imagining that one knows more than 
one actually does. ' 86 
Rather as On Prayer closes with a series of apophthegmata, 
drawing on the authority of the Desert Fathers, Gnostikos closes with 
a series of quotations from various authorities, including Basil of 
Caesarea, Athanasius, and Didymus the Blind. ' 87 Two final chapters 
tantalisingly suggest that the goal of the life of knowledge is merely 
a preparation for something else: theology, a restoring gaze upon 
God himself. 
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The goal of the praktike is to purify the intellect and to 
render it free of passions; that of the gnostike is to reveal 
the truth hidden in all beings; but to distance the intellect 
from matter and to turn it towards the First Cause - this 
is a gift of theology. 
Gazing fixedly upon the archetype, I strive to engrave 
the images without neglecting anything which might 
accomplish the gaining [back] of the fallen-away. '88 
vii. Kephalaia Gnostika 
We are thus taken, eventually, to Kephalaia Gnostika, the final part 
of the trilogy, in the hope of learning more about exactly what Evagrios 
understands contemplative prayer to be. However, as David Bundy has 
commented, this work is "deliberately disjointed and cryptic, intended 
only for those who are already committed to an ascetic life and who 
have the intellectual background to read the 'encoded' instructions". 189 
It is clearly intended to be read only by those who are advanced in 
the life of prayer, and have already achieved apatheia. Even then, it 
appears to be something intended as a basis for contemplation - not 
something which is to be read from beginning to end in a logical 
sequence of argument. It is, after all, offered as an aid to the person 
seeking God, who is beyond all words and images, and any encounter 
with whom is inevitably ineffable. All of this said, we find out some 
interesting things here about contemplative prayer. 
Firstly, contemplation is a kind of vision of the soul: 
THE sense, naturally by itself, senses sensory things, but 
the mind [nous] always stands and waits [to ascertain] 
which spiritual contemplation gives it vision. 190 
Secondly, and connected with this metaphorical vision, contemplation is 
concerned with knowledge, of God, of Christ, and of created beings: 
THE light of the nous is divided into three: 
knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, 
and the incorporeal nature that created by it. 
and the contemplation of beings. 191 
Knowledge of created things is concerned with their Aöyot, their inner 
essences or meanings. It is apatheia that enables this knowledge, or 
vision, of the inner essences of things: 
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THE noes that is divested of the passions and sees the 
logoi of beings does not henceforth truly receive the 
eidola that (arrive) through the senses; but it is as if 
another world is created by its knowledge, attracting 
to it its thought and rejecting far from it the sensitive 
world. 192 
Knowledge of God, however, is importantly different to the knowledge 
that is the concern of contemplation of created beings. God is "essential 
knowledge", never simply an "object" of contemplation. 193 Spiritual 
contemplation therefore remains, ultimately, a mystery. " Amongst 
many aspects of this mystery, however, Evagrios returns repeatedly 
to his vision of God as both Unity195 and Trinity, '9" and of Christ as 
existing in unique relationship both to God and human beings. 197 
Thirdly, contemplation is transformative: 
JUST as the senses are changed through being receptive 
of different qualities, so also the noun is changed, 
[through] constant gazing at diverse contemplations. '"' 
Contemplation is healing, 19' generative.. brings growth and life, 201 
is restorative, 20' and even deifying. 20' Contemplation of the logoi of 
judgement and providence appear to assume a particular significance 
in this process. For Evagrios. "judgement" is a matter of God's 
progressive transformation of reasoning beings (AoyLKOL, a category 
which includes but is not confined to human beings) in order to assist 
their spiritual development, and "providence" is a matter of God's 
provision of what is required to return them to the union with God 
from which they are fallen. 204 
Fourthly, Evagrios provides us with a definition of contem- 
plation: 
CONTEMPLATION is: 
spiritual knowledge of the things which have been and 
will be: 
it is this which causes the sous to ascend to its first 
rank . 
'"s 
Contemplation is defined, therefore, in terms of knowledge and of 
salvation of the human soul. Commenting on this definition, Dysinger 
suggests that we should see here a Christological and soteriological 
basis for the Evagrian theology of contemplation. Because God in 
Christ has both descended and ascended, the contemplative who. 
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by definition, has fallen from his primordial state is also enabled to 
ascend towards [knowledge of God. 2"6 
Fifthly, there are different kinds of contemplation. We have 
already seen that "natural" and "theological" contemplation are to 
be distinguished. However, in Kephalaia Gnostika, the classification 
becomes much more complex and inconsistent. There appears 
to be an expectation of progress from "second" to "first" natural 
contemplation: 
VIRTUES cause the noun to see second natural 
contemplation; and the latter cause it to see first [natural 
contemplation]; and the first in its turn (makes it see) the 
Blessed Un ity. 207 
Terminology of first and second natural contemplation occurs in 
Evagrian literature only in Kephalaia Gnostika, and nowhere else. 208 
There are also references to up to five kinds of contemplation: 
FIVE are the principal contemplations under which 
all contemplation is placed. It is said that the first is 
contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity; the 
second and third are the contemplation of incorporeal 
beings and of bodies. the fourth and the fifth are the 
contemplation of judgment and of providence. " 
Elsewhere, a different five-fold order is presented: 
WITH God is said to be: first, the one who knows the 
Holy Trinity; and next after him one who contemplates 
the logoi concerning the intelligible [beings]; third, 
then, is one who also sees the incorporeal beings; and 
then fourth is one who understands the contemplation 
of the ages; while one who has attained apatheia of his 
soul is justly to be accounted fifth, '. =10 
And elsewhere again different two and three fold orders are pres- 
ented. '" 
All ofthis is not easy to disentangle and the tangle is made no easier to 
unravel by the virtual interchangeability of the terms "contemplation" 
and -knowledge,.. 212 as well as an at times rather mystical use of the 
term "contemplation" in relation to Christ himself. -'' 3 If the tangle can 
be unravelled, it is clear that Evagrios only expects us to unravel it in 
the practice of contemplative prayer itself. 
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What is finally clear is that contemplative knowledge of God, 
Unity and Trinity, is the aim of the Evagrian system. 
5. Scripture 
Scriptural quotations, allusions and references are pervasive within 
the text of the Philokalia. Scripture is used to justify, illustrate, 
explain and facilitate the themes which the authors take. up. Again, 
with a work spanning so many centuries, it is not surprising to find 
that there are differences in frequency and style of reference, as well 
as in theological approach, to scripture. Thus, for example, there 
appears to be far more frequent explicit reference to scripture in 
the works of Peter of Damoskos than in any other author. However, 
the foundational importance of scripture to all of the authors of the 
Philokalia is evident'-' and so it deserves some further consideration 
here. 
Scripture is used again and again as justification for the ideas 
that are expressed in the Philokalia, even to the point of appearing 
to a modern reader to be contrived. Thus, for example, in Guarding 
the Intellect, by Isaiah the Solitary, we find a series of quotations 
from the Psalms used as authority for the hesychastic concept of 
"guarding of the heart": 
Holy Scripture speaks everywhere about the guarding 
of the heart, in both the Old and the New Testaments. 
David says in the Psalms: `O sons of men, how long 
will you be heavy of heart? ' (Ps. 4: 2. LXX), and again: 
`Their heart is vain' (Ps. 5: 9. LXX); and of those who 
think futile thoughts, he says: `For he has said in his 
heart, I shall not be moved' (Ps. 10: 6), and: `He has said 
in his heart. God has forgotten' (Ps. 10: 11)"21 ` 
It is not at all evident to us that such examples show that scripture 
speaks anywhere, let alone "everywhere", about guarding of the 
heart in the sense understood within the hesychastic tradition. In 
order to understand this apparently curious use of scripture we must 
consider the nature of the hermeneutical tools employed within the 
Philokalia. However, what must first be affirmed is that the authors 
of the Philokalia share an understanding that scripture provides 
foundational authority for their theology, anthropology, psychology 
and spirituality. Even if we, or their contemporaries, might argue that 
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their use of scripture is flawed, the important point for them appears 
to be that they are able to argue that what they believe about the inner 
life and prayer can be shown to be consistent with scripture and not 
alien to it. In this sense, even the later writers appear ultimately to 
rely not on tradition but rather on scriptural authority for what they 
teach. 
We should not, however, allow this reliance on scripture as 
authority to mislead us into thinking that scripture was primarily 
either a source of theological concepts and ideas or the means of 
justifying such concepts and ideas when they were drawn from 
elsewhere. The Philokalia is concerned primarily with prayer. and 
with the virtuous life as an essential basis for prayer, and so the 
importance of scripture is primarily as an aid to prayer and a guide 
to virtue. Thus, for example, Hesychios the Priest warns against an 
approach to scripture that avoids confrontation with its implications 
for practical living: 
He who does not know the truth cannot truly have faith; 
for by nature knowledge precedes faith. What is said in 
Scripture is said not solely for us to understand, but also 
for us to act upon., '' 
Further, meditation on scripture provides a means of approaching 
God in prayer. For example John of Karpathos, in For the Monks in 
India, states that: 
nothing so readily renews the decrepit soul, and enables 
it to approach the Lord, as fear of God, attentiveness, 
constant meditation on the words of Scripture, the 
arming of oneself with prayer, and spiritual progress 
through the keeping of vigils. '1 " 
Scripture is thus understood not as an end in itself but as a means 
of assisting the soul in its approach to God. Maximos the Confessor 
therefore warns that, if used incorrectly, scripture can hinder rather 
than assist in this process. 218 On the other hand, correctly used, 
scripture provides an essential aid to the intellect in its ascent to 
God. 219 
On the one hand, then, the writers of the Philokalia understand 
scripture as interpreting the human condition70 and leading the soul 
towards God. On the other hand, however, this process assumes that 
the human soul is also capable of properly interpreting scripture. 
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This reflexive hermeneutical process is largely implicit within the 
Philokalia, but it is an important one. Most frequently, it appears to 
assume the form of allegory. 
Allegory is to be found everywhere in the Patristic interpretation 
of scripture, and is certainly not unique to the Philokalia. Both 
the European Reformation and the Enlightenment have left a deep 
distrust of such an approach, which is seen as lacking in objectivity 
both theologically (because it supposedly avoids encounter with 
the divinely revealed truth contained in scripture) and scientifically 
(because it is perceived as the antithesis of the historical-critical 
method, making almost no effort to discern the "original" meaning 
of the text). 22' However, to approach the Philokalia with this kind 
of distrust is to completely misunderstand the Patristic method and 
purpose of allegorical interpretation. It is also to ignore the way 
in which modern hermeneutical thinking and Patristic allegorical 
interpretation of scripture both recognise that in fact texts are 
capable of multiple meanings and that the "original" meaning (if 
indeed that is accessible at all) is not the only possible valid one. 
Most importantly, it fails to appreciate the mystery, richness and 
depth that the Fathers found in scripture. Allegorical interpretation, 
understood in this way, is not a flawed method for uncovering 
objective meaning, it is rather (at least in the present, Christian, 
sense) an exploration of the mystery of God in Christ. It is, in fact, 
prayer. 
Examples of allegory abound within the pages of the Philokalia. 
For example, John Cassian interprets "the wicked of the earth" and 
"the children of Babylon", in Psalms 101 and 137 respectively, 
as being wicked thoughts. 222 The story of Ish-bosheth and his 
doorkeeper, in 2 Samuel 4: 5-8, is interpreted by Neilos the Ascetic 
as referring to the intellect and reason. 223 Maximos interprets Jacob's 
well, in John 4: 5-15, as a reference to scripture itself. 224 Nikitas 
Stithatos interprets the bread/food, the wine, and the oil, referred to 
in Psalms 104: 15 and 23: 5 as references to scripture, each in respect 
of a different stage of the spiritual life. 225 
Peter of Damaskos appears to be alone amongst the authors of 
the Philokalia in his expression of reservation at this hermeneutical 
method. Ironically, he expresses this reservation in the context of 
an approving reference in Book II to an allegorical interpretation 
of John 10: 1 by Maximos the Confessor, and further uses the same 
allegory himself in the course of his argument: 
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If, however, a thief or robber tries to enter, not by the 
proper door, but by `climbing up some other way', as the 
Lord puts it (John 10: 1), then the sheep - that is, according 
to St Maximos, divine thoughts - pay no attention to him. 
For the thief enters only so that he can deceive by hearsay, 
and kill the Scriptures by turning them into allegory, since 
he is unable to interpret them spiritually. Thus through 
his presumption and his pseudo-knowledge he destroys 
both himself and the divine thoughts contained in the 
Scriptures. But the shepherd, as a good soldier of Christ, 
feels compassion for these thoughts; and by keeping the 
divine commandments he enters in through the narrow 
gate (cf. Matt. 7: 13), the gate of humility and dispassion. 
Before receiving divine grace he devotes himself to 
studying and to learning about everything by listening to 
others; and whenever the wolf approaches in the guise of 
a sheep (cf. Matt. 7: 15), he chases him off by means of 
self-criticism, saying, `I do not know who you are: God 
knows. ' And should a thought approach shamelessly and 
ask to be received, saying to him, "if you do not watch 
over thoughts and discriminate between things, you are 
ignorant and lacking in faith', then he replies, `I f you cal l 
me a fool, I accept the title; for like St John Chrysostom I 
know that whoever is foolish in this world becomes wise, 
as St Paul puts it' (cf. I Cor. 3: 18). 226 
The intent of this discourse, in which thoughts are allegorically 
understood as sheep in both John 10 and Matthew 7, appears not so 
much to bean injunction against the use of allegory altogether (for that 
would invalidate both his own use of allegory, and that of Maximos) 
but rather a warning against "presumption"' and "pseudo-knowledge" 
which may be displayed in the inappropriate use of allegory by those 
unable to interpret the scriptures "spiritually"'. 227 Like Maximos, Peter 
therefore seems to be concerned about the possible misinterpretation 
of scripture by those who are not as wise as they would like to 
imagine. The solution - of ""spiritual" interpretation 
228 
- appears to 
be a combination of humility and dispassion, obedience to scriptural 
commands, willingness to learn from others, and a preparedness to 
appear foolish, if necessary, in being ready to admit to not knowing 
how to interpret. In other words, proper interpretation relies - at least 
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in part - upon acquisition of dispassion and virtue, but is ultimately 
a matter of the grace of God. A similar model is given expression 
elsewhere in the Philokalia by Diadochos of Photiki: 
Spiritual knowledge comes through prayer, deep stillness 
and complete detachment, while wisdom comes through 
humble meditation on Holy Scripture and, above all, 
through grace given by God. 229 
Here, interpretation of scripture begins to sound much more like 
contemplative prayer, and indeed other authors of the Philokalia also 
speak of it in this way. For example. we find Maximos the Confessor 
writing in Various Texts: (15: 
As soon as anyone practises the virtues with true 
intelligence, he acquires a spiritual understanding of 
Scripture. He worships God actively in the new way of 
the Spirit through the higher forms of contemplation, 
and not in the old way of the written, code (cf. Rom. 
7: 6), which makes man interpret the Law in an outward 
and sensual manner and, Judaic-like, fosters the passions 
and encourages sin., "" 
Spiritual interpretation of scripture thus appears to be itself a form 
of contemplative prayer. 
In some ways, this hermeneutic might be regarded as a hermeneutic 
of suspicion, for it recognises that human beings have a capacity to 
deceive themselves and it encourages the interpreter of scripture to 
distrust his or her own interpretation until finding confirmation of 
it elsewhere in scripture, or from those who are holier and wiser. 23' 
However, perhaps the terminology of suspicion is anachronistic here, 
for it evokes an age of scriptural interpretation informed by Freud, 
Nietzsche and Ricoeur and this is clearly not the world in which 
Peter of Damaskos lived. Rather, we should consider this to be a 
hermeneutic of humility, which recognises that the interpretation of 
scripture depends upon the grace of God, that no single interpretation 
is likely to exhaust its meaning, and that there are always others 
holier and wiser against whose interpretations one's own thoughts 
must be tested. 
This is not a completely pre-critical hermeneutical model. We 
have seen already that it is critical at the personal, subjective, level. 
Neither does it eschew academic study, although it does place this 
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in a broader context of the virtuous life and of prayer. It is also 
capable of accommodating source-critical comments, such as when 
we find John Cassian making reference to the reliability of the "best 
manuscripts". -'? 2 Indeed, it isa rich source of critical reflection, insofar 
as it values the criticism offered by the interpretations of tradition. 233 
However, it is not critical in a modern academic sense. Thus, for 
example. Peter of Damaskos appears unwilling to countenance the 
possibility that St Paul did not write the epistle to the Hebrews, or 
that Dionysios did not write the texts attributed to him. Moreover, 
his arguments against alternative authorship of these texts appear 
to reflect his own contemplative intuition, presumably reinforced 
by a sense of what he understood that tradition had taught on such 
matters. 
The hermeneutic most frequently encountered in the Philokalia 
thus appears to be a contemplative one. Any tendency towards 
extreme subjectivism is checked by the emphasis on humility and 
the appeal to the traditions of the Church. This might be criticised 
as making it inherently conservative. However, it is also radically 
reflective and reflexive. It emphasises scripture as a place of personal 
encounter with the Logos of God. 
6. Conclusions 
The influences upon, and foundations of, the Philokalia that have 
been considered here together reflect a focus on finding God within 
the human soul. Evagrios was himself a part of the tradition of 
the Egyptian desert, and the compilers of the Philokalia merely 
collated and passed on texts that they inherited. On this basis, one 
could argue that the three foundations of the Philokalia are actually 
scripture, tradition and reason, where the primary tradition is that 
of the Desert Fathers, and the primary appeal to reason is that of 
Plato. However, this would be to gloss over the enormous original 
contribution made by Evagrios, who translated and made sense of 
the Christian traditions of the Egyptian desert in a highly perceptive 
way. If the anthropology of the Philokalia is fundamentally Platonic, 
then surely its psychology is fundamentally Evagrian. 
